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ABSTRACT 
John A. Sandell: Notes Towards a Spatial Reading of Marx’s Fragment on Machines 
(Under the direction of John Pickles) 
This thesis contributes to the current project of developing new critical urban theory in response 
to the economic, social, and technological transformations of the early 21st century. More 
specifically, it focuses on a recent metropolitanization of post-Workerist theories of cognitive 
capitalism by arguing for a need to more carefully interrogate the underlying base of such 
theories and its implications for the contemporary theorization of cities. In particular, a section 
in Karl Marx’s notebooks known as the Fragment on Machines is identified as a key text that 
provides the foundation for contemporary theories of cognitive and post-industrial capitalism. 
Drawing on a largely forgotten book by eminent spatial theorist Henri Lefebvre, I suggest the 
importance of reading and thinking Marx’s Fragment in spatial terms. Introducing the problem of 









  iv  
  
















  v  
  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This thesis, in more than one sense, constitutes the end point of a journey that I had the fortune 
to share with many others. From the intellectual challenge of graduate seminars that pushed me 
to think through my confusion to the difficulties of wrapping up a sprawling thesis project, I 
have relied on the brilliance and care of an incredible group of people.  
 
First of all, Scott, Eloisa, Amy, Jim, Willie, and the rest of the 2012 geography cohort: heartfelt 
thanks for sharing this time with me. I am especially grateful for the way you took care of me 
through some difficult times during my first year in Chapel Hill. Ahsan, Annelies, Ben, Darius, 
Mabel, Rachel, Ruth, Sertanya, Stevie, and a number of others became important friends along 
the way. Your insights and enthusiasm keep inspiring me. Helen and Pavithra helped me keep 
moving towards an occasionally elusive end point – you deserve a special thank you.  
 
A special thanks also goes to my committee, John, Scott, and Alvaro, for your patient support, 
flexibility and scholarly acumen. It has been a privilege and pleasure to learn from such dedicated 
academics through seminars and in conversations. I will continue to rediscover and learn from 
your many lessons over the coming years. The remaining shortcomings of this thesis would 
certainly be more severe if not for your thoughtful feedback.  
 
And finally, to my family and Kendra, who have supported me in all ways imaginable over 




  vi  
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1. VIGNETTES ............................................................................................................................ 1 	
2. BROAD INTRODUCTIONS – SETTING THE SCENCE .................................................. 4 	
3. BROAD ACTUAL BEGINNINGS: INTERROGATING HARD & NEGRI’S 
METROPOLIS ....................................................................................................................... 10 	
4. ON THE AMBIGUITY OF MARX’S FRAGMENT ON MACHINES ............................... 17 	
4.1	 The Fragment as an outline of a Machinic Dystopia	..........................................................................................	18		
4.2	 The Fragment as a path to Socialist Utopia	.......................................................................................................	20		
5. POST-WORKERISM AND MARX’S FRAGMENT ............................................................. 25 	
5.1	 The Fragment and The Era of Cognitive Capitalism	.........................................................................................	27		
5.2	 The Fragment as a theory of Cognitive Cooperation	...........................................................................................	30		
5.3	 The Fragment as a Theory of Capitalist Crisis	...................................................................................................	34		
5.4	 Critique of the Fragment as Crisis theory and the Notion of Relative Surplus Value	......................................	35		
6. ACCELERATIONISM AND THE PROBLEM OF TECHNOLOGY ............................... 44 	
6.1	 Critiques of technology – Workerism before the Fragment	..................................................................................	48	
	
6.2	 Alquati and the Study of the Olivetti factory	......................................................................................................	49		
7. THE FRAGMENT AND  URBAN TRANSFORMATIONS ............................................... 56 	
8. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 	
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................................. 65 







London, England, December 2012: Mayor Boris Johnson, together with Prime Minister David 
Cameron, opens the “Electric City” conference at the London School of Economics by 
revealing a set of large-scale investments in London’s digital infrastructure. These investments 
particularly target an area of the capital city colloquially known as the “Silicon Roundabout” 
because of its high concentration of tech firms. In his opening speech Johnson argues the city’s 
legacy of scientific and technological innovation “drove” the industrial revolution that once 
made London “the heart of the greatest industrial and commercial empire the world has ever 
seen”(Urban Age 2012). Building on this tradition, Johnson continues, the city’s new 
investments in digital infrastructures were once again “asserting London’s lead as the tech capital 
of Europe, if not the world” (Ibid). 
… 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2010: Mayor Eduardo Paes partners with IBM to install an “urban control 
center” – a centralized hub for information processing and management of city services. The 
control center gathers over 20 city agencies under one roof, houses an 80 square meter high-
definition video wall, (“the biggest in Latin America”) and is populated by personnel donning 
identical white jumpsuits(Soffel 2013). This center continuously collects data from a wide array 
of sensors located throughout the city, tracking the daily unfolding of traffic, crime, public 
transportation and weather events. Organized around a “smart” map of the city overlaid with 
real-time data, the center aims to create an integrated system, both to coordinate everyday 
services and to anticipate and divert potential crises. The “biggest benefits” of the urban control 
center, Mayor Paes tells CNN in an interview, “are the bad things that don't happen, that won't 
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come to reality because of it"(Soffel 2013). 
… 
USA, October 22nd 2014: Thousands of drivers working for the “ride sharing service” Uber go on 
strike in five major American cities. Protesting against exploitative working conditions and 
dwindling incomes, the workers’ strike is triggered by the company’s decision to lower the price 
of its services while also increasing its cut of the fares to 20-28% depending on the service and 
location (Burns 2014). Started in 2009, Uber operates a smartphone application that, according 
to their website “quickly connects drivers with people who need a ride”(Uber 2015). Part of 
what is commonly referred to as the “sharing economy,” Uber’s business model is to provide a 
platform for facilitating the “ridesharing” transaction between drivers and potential customers. 
The company does not own any cars and employs minimally, instead relying on the labor and 
assets (in this case, cars) of independently contracted drivers who constitute a highly flexible 
labor force. This independent contractor model also makes it difficult for drivers to unionize. 
However, faced with the increased difficulties of making a living, drivers have recently organized 
several associations including the California App-based Drivers Association (CADA) and the 
London Private Hire App-based Drivers Associations (LPHADA), which have been central to 
the coordination of recent protests. As Yaseen Aslam, member of LPHADA, explains: “At the 
end of the day, it is the drivers who make Uber successful …Without them, Uber’s technology is 
useless” (Burns 2014). 
… 
New York City, USA, May 2013: Representatives from 14 major cities, among them London and 
Rio de Janeiro, are invited to New York City for the inaugural “Digital Cities Symposium.” The 
main goal of this event is, according the press release, to “create a global forum for city 
government practitioners to share best practices in digital development”(NYC.gov 2013). The 
symposium marks an important milestone in the NYC Digital Initiative, a project established by 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s administration in 2011 with the explicit goal to make New York 
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City into the “world’s leading digital city”(Ibid.). So far, the initiative has included a broad set of 
projects ranging from large investments in digital infrastructure such as fiber-optic and Wi-Fi 
networks, to an extensive open data policy making over 2000 of the city’s datasets available to 
public and private interests. Additionally, as part of NYC Digital, New York City has partnered 
with three private universities to launch an “applied sciences initiative,” created with the goal to 
strengthen the presence of computer and data-centered expertise in the city. This initiative alone 
is referred to by the mayor as “the largest and most far reaching economic development effort 


























2.  BROAD INTRODUCTIONS – SETTING THE SCENCE 
 
In the mid-1990’s, popular books such as Bill Mitchell’s City of Bits (1996) and Nicholas 
Negroponte’s Being Digital (1995) provocatively argued that the spread of digital networks and 
computer technologies were rapidly diminishing the importance of traditional cities as spatial 
condensation points for social, political and economic processes. Cyberspace, Mitchell suggested, 
was “profoundly anti-spatial” (1996, 8), and its growth was leading the way towards a further 
decoupling of accessibility and interaction from spatial proximity. Some even went so far as to 
argue – in what can best be described as a techno-fetishistic precursor to what Thomas L. 
Friedman would later call the “flat world” – that digital networks would soon spell “the end of 
geography” (Friedman 2005; Moriset and Malecki 2009; Thielmann 2010, 3). These hyperbolic 
propositions were made at a time when the widespread adoption of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) had already facilitated a post-Fordist restructuring of global 
capitalism, rapidly transforming many former industrial production hubs in Europe and North 
America into seemingly obsolete and barren urban wastelands. What Manual Castells would 
theorize as the “rise of the network society” seemed to only further establish this intimate 
connection between digital technologies and an epochal shift towards a post-cold war, globalized 
footloose economy coordinated through financial and informational networks (Castells 1996). 
Even critical theorists bought into this vision by famously proclaiming that the defining 
characteristics of this millennial society was the simultaneous pervasiveness and placelessness of 
capital and power (Hardt and Negri 2000).  
 Geographers were less easily persuaded by this vision of an increasingly 
“deterritorialized,” “smooth,” and “friction-less,” global “Empire” produced through global 
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networks. Instead, they argued that these networked technologies and the economic processes 
they facilitated remained thoroughly embedded within uneven material, social and political 
territories (see for example Smith 2005). The networked society, then, wasn’t so much doing 
away with the importance of geography as it was producing a whole set of new geographies in 
urgent need of analysis (Crang et. al. 1999). However, even these more critical approaches (and 
they came in many different forms), often departed from, and reproduced, certain ideas of a 
fundamental historical shift of importance from cities to digital networks (Crang and Graham 
2007). As some argued, digital networked technologies and the globalizing processes facilitated 
by them were leading to a rapid splintering and peripherialization of many urban landscapes (see 
for example: Graham and Marvin 1996; Graham and Marvin 2001). 
The starting point for this thesis is the recognition that over the last decade, ideas of an 
antagonistic relationship between digitalization and urbanization have largely given way to a view 
of these processes as more or less mutually constitutive (Graham 2004).1 As cities have become 
the sites of deployment of increasingly complex technical systems, researchers have turned their 
interests to the complicated entanglements of computers and cities (Crang and Graham 2007; 
Kitchin and Dodge 2011; Thrift and French 2002). And as global urban populations continues to 
rise and urban landscapes are extended, the ongoing “planetarization of the urban” is 
increasingly recognized as deeply imbricated with (and indeed inseparable from) processes of 
“planetary-scale computing” (Lefebvre 2014; Brenner 2014; Bratton 2014). If the 1990’s was a 
decade obsessed with the possibility of transcending the limitations of physical space by means of 
digital technologies (as among others media theorist Lev Manovich has argued), it seems that in 
the first decades of the new millennia, this obsession has largely been replaced by an interest in 
computers and electronic information in space (Manovich 2006). 
This theoretical ‘reterritorialization’ of the networked society finds material 
correspondence in the recent proliferation of digital- and smart city projects in many cities across 																																																								
1 One example of this shift is that the notion of a digital city today is no longer understood primarily in 
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the world. As suggested by the opening vignettes, city governments are today increasingly 
turning to digital entrepreneurs and large tech corporations for solutions to the pressing urban 
management and growth problems of the 21st century. The resulting urban programs often 
involve investments in both social and technical infrastructures– and are frequently couched in 
discourses of “technological solutionism” where the ubiquity of urban computing technologies 
and data flows are said to offer unprecedented opportunities to resolve complicated urban 
problems. As with the example of Rio de Janeiro’s urban control center, these solutions often 
propose the possibility of optimizing and reorganizing cities according to cybernetic logics of 
feedback and control (Halpern et al. 2013; Haque 2012; Morozov 2013). At the same time, we 
can see with the example of NYC Digital how such projects also contain a renewed emphasis on 
the value of cities as a locus of human interaction and creativity, understood to provide key 
inputs and sources of innovation in an economy increasingly centered around digital 
information. 
 How do we understand these emergent urban assemblages, “digital/nondigital 
imbrications,” and socio-spatial configurations that characterize the contemporary (digital) city 
(cf. Sassen 2008)? What are the specific relationships today between digital technologies, urban 
space and contemporary capitalism? These are some of the broad questions that have inspired 
the writing of this thesis. From the perspective of established urban theory, some have argued 
that the urban has increasingly become a “strategic site” and “new frontier” for a Silicon Valley-
driven political economy, especially after the great recession of 2008 (cf. Sassen 2001).2  Put in 
other words, perhaps these projects constitute what some of the most regarded commentators 
on urban development might understand as the latest “spatial fix” of networked neoliberalism in 
need of expanding markets and territories, as well as infrastructures for facilitating an ever 																																																								
2 For example, data management companies such as Microsoft, IBM, Cisco, and Google, have 
increasingly positioned themselves as urban problem-solvers (See Luque-Ayala and Marvin 2015; McNeill 
2015). 
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accelerating circulation of capital (cf. Harvey 2001)? 
However, while I think this story can to a certain extent be explained through the 
established frameworks of critical urban theory – uneven development, the urban as a secondary 
circuit of capital, the urban as a consumptive spectacle, neoliberal urban entrepreneurialism etc. 
–these existing frameworks have limitations when it comes to allowing us to capture and 
interrogate with any level of detail the specific nature of these emergent imbrications of 
technology, capital, and urban space.3 Rather, stemming from a particular linage of Marxist 
theorizations of geography and space most famously developed by David Harvey and Neil 
Smith, many of these inherited critical urban lenses might actually in their relative orthodoxy 
serve to obscure certain aspects such as the emergent imbrications of techno-capitalism and 
urbanization, and subsequently also hamper the development of new critical conceptions of 
contemporary forms of urbanism.  
In a set of recent writings, urban theorists Neil Brenner and Christian Schmid have 
argued that that over the past decades “the form of urbanization has been radically reconfigured, 
a process that has seriously called into question the inherited cartographies that have long 
underpinned urban theory and research” (Brenner and Schmid 2012, 11). Processes of socio-
spatial restructuring, intimately related to the transformations of global capitalism have, in their 
meaning, rendered some of the basic grammar of urban theory obsolete.  Drawing on Marxist 
theorist Fredric Jameson, Brenner and Schmid therefore suggest an urgent need to develop new 
“cognitive map[s]” through which to decipher the emergent landscapes of urbanization under 
the conditions early twenty-first century capitalism, and thus lay the foundation for a 
reinvigorated critical urban theory (Urban Age, 749).4  
This thesis represents one small contribution to this project of developing new cognitive 																																																								
3 For examples of these different theories see Harvey 2006; Harvey 1989; Smith 2008. 
 
4 For them, this project includes developing “new theoretical categories … a new conceptual lexicon … 
[and] boundary-exploding methodological strategies” (Brenner and Schmid 2012, 13) 
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maps for ‘finding our way’ around contemporary urban landscapes. Following the examples 
presented in this introduction, I will focus on how to approach and understand what appears to 
be a changing relationship between digital technologies, urbanization, and capitalist globalization. 
The purpose of developing such maps is to situate the landscapes of the digital city in relation to 
a larger totality constituted by globalized capital, as well as delineate how it might connect to 
more specific processes such as gentrification and securitization of urban space. More 
importantly, new maps should also allow us to better understand what forms of urban politics 
and sites of resistance that most effectively can help make this new urban landscape a more (and 
not less) egalitarian and democratic place to live.   
In this thesis, I depart more specifically from a recent set of theoretical frameworks that 
have attempted to provide an alternative model of explaining this above outlined shifted towards 
an urban-centered digital economy. The gist of these frameworks, which have been forwarded by 
some of the most prominent scholars in the discipline of Geography, is that cities constitute 
creative and cognitive nodes in an economy increasingly driven by immaterial and knowledge-
based innovation (Scott 2007; 2008; 2011; Thrift 2012; Wyly 2013). In what economic geography 
Allen Scott has referred to as Cognitive-Cultural Capitalism, urban territories become essential 
social factories that produce the main inputs and outputs in an economy centered around ideas, 
information, and affects. However, without much attribution, these frameworks have borrowed 
heavily both in concepts and in argument from an arguably more radical theoretical tradition: the 
(mostly) Italian school of post-Workerist thought. Many of the central figures within this 
tradition, which will be introduced more carefully introduced in section 5 of this thesis, have for 
decades be theorizing around the shifting character of the capitalist system using terms such as 
cognitive, immaterial, and biopolitical production (see Hardt & Negri 2000; 2009; Moulier-
Boutang 2012; Vercellone 2007). 
In this thesis, I argue for the importance of carefully interrogating this theoretical legacy 
that has so clearly inspired recent theorizations within Geography, in order to critically evaluate 
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its implications as basis for developing new cognitive maps for urban politics in the 21st century. 
In particular, I will trace the post-Workerist theorizations of cognitive capitalism back to a 
particular reading of an influential section of Karl Marx’s notebooks (Grundrisse) known as the 
‘Fragment on Machines’. As I will argue, how this section has been read has had significant 
impact on the theories that have subsequently been inspired by it. Given what I identify as a set 
of problematic shortcomings in these influential readings of Marx’s Fragment for thinking the 
contemporary metropolis, the purpose of this thesis is then to begin to outline the following 
question: how can we read Marx’s Fragment in a way more adequate for theorizing 
contemporary urbanism?5 
The method that I make use of in this thesis is a set of close readings of the primary text 
(Marx’s Fragment on Machines), as well as wide set of texts that either reference or comment on 
this text or theories that have been based on it. In particular, I will make comparisons between 
the influential post-Workerist readings of the text, and a largely forgotten engagement with 
Marx’s Fragment by the eminent urban theorist Henri Lefebvre. As I will show, in the latter 
reading we find potential for developing a spatially more sophisticated theory of the 









5 I take inspiration here from Paolo Virno, who has called for the need to develop a “fundamental 
critique of the fragment”(see page 24 in this thesis). However, I suggest here that is not just the Fragment 
itself that needs to be critically interrogated, but also the ways in which it has been read into theorizations 
of the present.  





3. ACTUAL BEGINNINGS: INTERROGATING HARDT & NEGRI’S 
METROPOLIS 
 
In Commonwealth, the third and final installment in their Empire-trilogy, Hardt & Negri make 
an important modification to their well-known diagnosis of the political, social, and economic 
landscape of struggle in the beginning of the 21st century. In Empire, they identified the primary 
terrain of struggle over increasingly immaterial , cognitive, and biopolitical forms of production 
largely with the decentered, smooth, and networked space of globalized ‘Empire’: “Empire is… 
really a non-place” (Hardt and Negri 2000, 190)).6 A decade later in Commonwealth, however, it 
is “the metropolis that has become the primary locus of biopolitical production” (Hardt and 
Negri 2009, 244).7  
This metropolitanization of Hardt & Negri’s thinking is perhaps not so surprising given 
the growing recognition that “‘the so-called ‘information society’ is an increasingly urban 
society” (Graham 2004, 16). If the 1990’s discourse around ‘the rise of the networked society’ 
was, as we saw in the introduction, characterized by cyberspatial “dreams of transcendence” (to 
which Hardt & Negri’s Empire posed a form of internal critique), it seems that the following 
decade delivered the sobering insight that the ‘digital age’ did not so much lead to the 
																																																								
6 And as they suggest in Empire, “[t]he struggles to contest and subvert Empire, as well as those to 
construct a real alternative, will thus take place on the imperial terrain itself” (Hardt and Negri 2000, xv) 
 
7 Biopolitical production, they define In Empire, as ”the production of social life itself, in which the 
economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and invest one another.” (Hardt & Negri 
2000,xii)  
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abandonment or obsolescence of the city as a focal point for economic, social and political 
processes, but rather to its complex remediation (Ibid).8  
While instituting an important shift in geographical imaginary from the supposedly 
smooth space of the informational network to the irregular and differentiated texture of the 
urban, Hardt & Negri’s theorization of the contemporary metropolis is one that continues to 
take its departure in an already assumed historical transition to a new era of capitalist 
development defined by the hegemony of networked, cognitive, and immaterial production.9 
Building on their notion of immaterial labor as the hegemonic figure of this new form of 
capitalism, Hardt & Negri in Commonwealth construct an image of the contemporary city as 
being transformed in accordance with the needs and characteristics of this new form and figure 
of production.10 “Biopolitical production”, they suggest,” is transforming the city, creating a new 
metropolitan form” (Hardt & Negri 2009, 251). The centrality of the metropolis in this new 
form of capitalism is primarily as a technical and social infrastructure that supports “biopolitical 
entrepreneur[ship]” of immaterial and cognitive workers (Ibid, 298).11 The metropolis here 
functions as an urban “common” of living knowledge (languages, codes, and affects; networks of 
communication and modes of cooperation), which serves as the most important foundation and 
																																																								
8 For examples of the first position, see (Negroponte 1995; Mitchell 1996; Castells 2010). For the second, 
see (Sassen 2001; Graham 2004; Barnes 2010). Some argue that this can explained by the shift from 
stationary to increasingly mobile or post-desktop technologies (see for example de Souza e Silva 2006; 
Farman 2012); whereas others highlight the ubiquity of digital hardware and software in urban space, and 
how they have become central to the functioning to pretty much any urban infrastructure (Thrift and 
French 2002; Crang and Graham 2007). 
 
9 Thus building on and extending, rather than revising, the position they established in Empire.  
 
10 See for example page 29, where they articulate how it is this Italian tradition of the ‘general intellect’ 
that constitutes the basis for their model of production (it should be added, building also on the French 
tradition, especially the work of Foucault and Deleuze & Guattari). The terms biopolitical and immaterial 
production are used somewhat interchangeably by Hardt & Negri to represent this new paradigm of 
production.  	
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raw material for an immaterial or biopolitical economy, as well as the primary output of its 
production. 
  This metropolis, they argue, is also characterized by a growing antagonism between the 
socialized productivity of immaterial labor, and the vampire-like value extractions of capital. No 
longer able to directly organize the production process (this is one of the central aspects of their 
theorization of a shift from material to immaterial labor), capital is increasingly becoming a 
barrier to, rather than facilitator of, the productive capacities of this emergent metropolitan 
form. On the one hand then, the metropolis is now the primary terrain for the immaterial and 
networked production of social life (immaterial or biopolitical production no longer centers on 
the production of commodities, but on the production of life itself), and on the other hand, it 
functions as an apparatus of capture that facilitates the increasingly parasitic practices of value 
extraction from these collective and social forms of production. Immanent to Hardt & Negri’s 
metropolis are thus already the (im)material, and political conditions for a post-capitalist society, 
realizable through a liberation of the growing capacities for social(ly networked) production in 
and of common(s) from the regressive force of capital. In other words, this biopolitical 
metropolis appears in Commonwealth as the primary landscape of transition “through” which to 
get “beyond capital” (Hardt and Negri 2000; 2009) 
However, in its focus on the activities and productivity of the latest and most 
technologically advanced forms of capitalist development as the most significant and strategic  
sites of post-capitalist potentiality, Hardt & Negri’s theorization of a biopolitical metropolis 
poses a teleological and somewhat developmentalist narrative of transformation. I argue in this 
thesis that their theory thus runs the risk of becoming an apologetic for, rather than challenge to, 
the contemporary urban frontiers of techno-capitalism.12 In Commonwealth, they introduce a 
																																																								
12 See for example, how they propose a model of distributed urban entrepreneurship as holding the key to 
a post-capitalist transition (306) 
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metropolitan reformist program aimed at strengthening the urban multitudes’ capacities for 
biopolitical production that shows striking similarities with those contemporary technology-
driven urban revitalization projects exemplified in the vignettes. 13  For Hardt & Negri, such 
developments are more or less embraced as they seem to represent the path towards a post-
capitalist transition by pushing the antagonism between immaterial labor and capital into a higher 
level.  
In this thesis, I seek to interrogate and problematize this position on the hegemony of 
immaterial/biopolitical production as a basis for a critical theorization of the contemporary 
metropolis. I do this by turning to the one of the most important historical reference points that 
undergirds Hardt & Negri’s urban transition argument: Karl Marx’ famous so called  ‘Fragment 
on Machines’. An enigmatic piece of writing from Marx’s notebooks, the Fragment constitutes a 
foundational part and common reference point for a set of influential theories and debates 
around contemporary capitalism that goes under the labels of post-Workerism and 
Accelerationism.14 The Fragment is, however, a text characterized by an ambiguity, both 
thematically and structurally, lending itself to a multiplicity of readings.15 In post-Workerist and 
Accelerationist engagements with the Fragment, this ambiguity is often read in tendential and 
teleological terms, where the seemingly dystopic scenario of a society dominated by machines 
outlined in the first part of the text is understood as providing the necessary material, social, and 
political pre-conditions for a transition to a post-capitalist society outlined in the second part.  																																																								
13  Compare Hardt & Negri 2009, 306-311, with NYC Digital, briefly outlined in one of the vignettes.   
 
14 In the Fragment, Marx both describes a tendency towards increased machinic automation in the 
production process, but also how this leads the production process to come under the control of a 
“general intellect”, a form of “general social knowledge” which increasingly comes to replace human 
labor time as the “great well-spring of wealth” in society. It is especially this latter notion of the general 
intellect that has been central to post-Workerist theorizations.  
 
15 Paolo Virno has, for example, called ’the fragment’ ”a litmus test”, implying that it tends to change 
color depending on the context in which it is referenced.  
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By reading the Fragment as a form of revolutionary theory of post-industrial society 
avant la lettre, however, post-Workerists and Accelerationists problematically pose a form of 
singular global trajectory through which all spaces and peoples must (or already have) pass(ed) in 
order to obtain a revolutionary potential adequate for the information age.16, 17, 18 This reading 
downplays the relational coexistence between a multiplicity of socio-spatial and socio-technical 
trajectories, instead incorporating such multiplicities under one singular tendency, reproducing a 
historical and geographical imaginary that John Law has aptly called the “one-world world” 
(2011). In this thesis, I argue that this renders a highly problematic starting point for thinking 
and theorizing the uneven and highly differentiated socio-spatial landscape of the contemporary 
																																																								
16 Cf. Massey (2005). These are propositions that, as Massey argues, ”turn geography into history, space 
into time. And this again has social and political effects. It says that Moçambique and Nicaragua are not 
really different from ‘us’. We are not to imagine them as having their own trajectories, their own 
particular histories, and potential for their own, perhaps different, futures. They are not recognized as 
coeval others. They are merely at an earlier stage in the one and only narrative it is possible to tell. That 
cosmology of ‘only one narrative’ obliterates the multiplicities, the contemporaneous heterogeneities of 
space. It reduces simultaneous coexistence to place in the historical queue.” (Massey 2005, 5)  
 
17 It is important to note here that Hardt & Negri themselves argue against any crude developmentalist 
model of historical stages of development as an explanation for geographical differentiation (Hardt & 
Negri 2000, 288). Instead, they suggest, these are “ lines of the new global hierarchy of production” 
where “[t]he economic stages are thus present all present at once, merged into a hybrid, composite 
economy that varies not in kind but in degree across the globe.” (Ibid, 288; 289). However, at the same 
time, their work (as well that of many of their Italian post-Workerist colleagues on which they draw) 
departs precisely from a highly situated and tendential analysis of the new informational and networked 
economy as the ‘highest’ or ‘most advanced’ sector of production, which in turn comes to provide the 
empirical (and ontological) model for Empire. There is for Hardt & Negri no outside to this global 
informational and biopolitical sphere; everything, including “real alternatives and the potentials for 
liberation ...exist within Empire” (Ibid, 46, their emphasis).  Accordingly, the forms of political 
subjectivities and resistance; the new constitutive and potentially autonomous power of the multitude to 
which they attach revolutionary potential, comes to be defined through this global networked model of 
production. The only way is “through and beyond Empire” (ibid, xv). At the same time, they dismiss and 
residualize localized forms of resistance in the era of Empire, relying here what is arguably a 
simplified/crude geographical imaginary that separates the local from the global through (Ibid, 46-47). 
  
18 The problematic nature of this revolutionary path of “through and beyond” has been articulated by 
several critics of the recent and in some ways more controversial reading of the ‘fragment’ as part of the 
theoretical fad known as ‘accelerationism’ (see, for example, Noys 2014). From the accelerationists 
viewpoint, the fragment constitutes a political call for ‘technological acceleration’, suggesting in a joyfully 
nihilistic fashion that the crucial revolutionary problematic of today is that we have not yet become 
machinic enough (see Srnicek and Williams 2013; Mackay and Avanessian 2014).  
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(digitalizing) metropolis, which as so many have argued, is constituted precisely through its 
contemporaneous multiplicity of potentialities and trajectories, “as a simultaneity of stories-so-
far” (Massey 2005, 9; see also Massey 2007; Roy 2009).  
Against a sequential reading of the fragment, which lays the basis for theories of the 
cognitive metropolis that have become increasingly common also within the discipline of 
Geography as of late (see for example Scott 2008, 2011, Thrift 2012), I propose to instead refract 
the fragment’s ambiguity through the lens of space. Here I take inspiration from Doreen 
Massey’s three-fold conceptualization of space as relational, heterogeneous, and always 
becoming (Massey 2005).19 By reading the Fragment spatially, we thus start from an anti-
teleological premise, insisting on the co-existence of multiple (and often contradictory) 
trajectories, and on spatial process such as urbanization as contingent, heterogeneous, and 
struggled over, thus always remaining open to multiple different outcomes. That is, instead of 
posing machinic subsumption as an historical precondition for the emergence of an economy 
centered on social capacities for immaterial and cognitive production, I will suggest that this 
introduction of the problem of space into theory of the cognitive metropolis will be disruptive of some 
of its central propositions.20  
In order to further develop this spatial critique, I turn to one of the primary critical 
theorists of space, Henri Lefebvre, and his reading of the Fragment in the often overlooked 																																																								
19 Massey’s understanding of space is based on the following three propositions: “[f]irst, that we recognize 
space as the production of interrrelations; as constituted through interactions, from the immensity of the 
global to the intimately tiny… Second, that we understand space as the sphere of the possibility of the 
existence of multiplicity in the sense of contemporaneous plurality; as the sphere in which distinct 
trajectories coexist; as the sphere therefore of coexisting heterogeneity. Without space, no multiplicity; 
without multiplicity, no space. … Third, that we recognize space as always under construction. Precisely 
because space on this reading is a product of relations-between, relations which are necessarily embedded 
material practices which have to be carried out, it is always in the process of being made. It is never 
finished; never closed.“(Massey 2005, 9) 	
20 I here draw on David Harvey, who in describing the contribution of geographical theory to the 
theorization of late capitalism has suggested that “[g]eographical knowledge tends to get shoved aside, 
marginalized, or even dismiss because it poses very awkward and even disruptive problems for 
conventional forms of disciplinary wisdom… [and] that the insertion of space into any social theory 
(including that generally dubbed Marxist) is disruptive of its central propositions.” (Harvey 2002, 181).   	
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book La Pensée Marxiste et la Ville (Marxist Thought and the City, 1973). In La Pensée, we see an 
ambiguity around the development anticipated in the Fragment, which for Lefebvre is intimately 
connected to the technocratizaton of the urban, the disintegration and disappearance of work, 
and the increasing confinement of urban populations under regimes of automation, calculation 
and control. Lefebvre’s pessimistic reading of the Fragment – which lifts the question of the 
transformation of machinery (and increasingly entire urban landscapes) in accordance with a 
capitalist logic of exploitation and extraction and cybernetic logic of control –seems to pick up 
on the ambiguous aspects of the Fragment and suggests the possibility of multiple or 
indeterminate outcomes of a machinic society. What Lefebvre offers, I suggest, is a spatial 
reading of the Fragment, which constitutes an important challenge to the optimistic and 
teleological post-Workerist engagements with this text. Reading the Fragment spatially rather than 
temporally is thus identified as a valuable point of departure for developing a contemporary urban 
reading/critique of the Fragment, and by extension, a more solid ground for developing new 



















4. ON THE AMBIGUITY OF MARX’S FRAGMENT ON MACHINES  
 
In the Grundrisse, a collection of notebooks written in the late 1850’s, Karl Marx attempts a 
skeletal outlining of his larger critique of political economy and of capitalism as world system. 
Towards the end of these notebooks, Marx introduces a set of strangely prescient ideas around 
the development of automated machines and the growing importance of distributed forms of 
intelligence. This section, famously referred to as the ‘Fragment on Machines,’ is one of the most 
cited and referenced parts of the Grundrisse, and a text that has come to figure as a key part of a 
wide-ranging set of theoretical arguments and debates on the role of science and technology in 
capitalism.21 While machinery and science are discussed on numerous other places in his writings 
(such as in the long 15th chapter on machinery in Capital Vol.1), perhaps nowhere else does 
Marx reach the same speculative heights on the topic as in the Fragment.  
A careful reading of the Fragment suggests that it would be more accurate to speak of 
Marx’s fragments on machines. For the text constitutes less a unified development of a singular 
idea or thesis than a set of parallel or dialectical elaborations on different potentialities inherent 
in a by Marx identified tendency towards the increasing importance of machinery and science in 
capitalist production. The Fragment, therefore, can be divided into two main sections; each of 
which develop rather different scenarios for the coming machinic age anticipated by Marx; one 
dystopic and gloomy, and one utopian and revolutionary.  																																																								
21 As already suggested, the ‘Fragment’ constitutes a central reference point for both the post-Workerist 
tradition (see Keucheyan 2013), as well as for the more recent heretical and nihilistic school of 
contemporary thought known as Accelerationism (Mackay and Avanessian 2014). But the ‘Fragment’ is 
also referenced and discussed (to give a few examples); as a key text by Ernest Mandel in his Late 
Capitalism (Mandel 1972); as a basis for David Harvey’s discussion on fixed capital (and subsequently the 
spatial fix) in his opus Limits to Capital (1982) ; as part of the great chapter on the capitalist machine in 
Deleuze & Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus (1972), and in Henri Lefebvre’s La Pensée Marxist et La Ville (1972) and 
The Survival of Capitalism (1973) which both led up to his major work on the Production of Space (1974).  
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Delineating the ambiguity between these two parallel scenarios provides an important 
starting point for interrogating the ways in which the fragment has been read into the 
contemporary moment, as well as how it might be read differently. 
 
4.1 The Fragment as an outline of a Machinic Dystopia   
In the first section of the Fragment (roughly constituted by pages 690-699),22 Marx opens with a 
discussion on the development of fixed capital from simple tools or instruments of labor into 
large-scale forms of machinery.23 The “culmination” of this process, Marx suggests, is the 
“automatic system of machinery”, which constitutes fixed capital in its “most adequate form”.24 
This adequacy stems more specifically from the fact that while dramatically increasing the 
productive capacities, automated machinery at the same time reduces the role and autonomous 
power of living labor in the production process, thereby increasing both the potential 
profitability and power of capital. The skills and “virtuosity” that were once the exclusive 
property of workers is now increasingly reconstituted in the machine while “[t]he workers 
activity, reduced to a mere abstraction of activity, is determined on all sides by the movement of 
the machinery, and not the opposite” (693).25 Rather than animating production, living labor is 																																																								
22 Page numbers refer to the 1993 Penguin Classic edition. (Marx 1993) 
 
23 Fixed capital can in the Marxian vocabulary be understood simply as means or instruments of labor 
used in capitalist surplus production. As David Harvey importantly points out, “since capital is defined as 
‘value in motion’, it follows that that fixed capital must also be so regarded. Fixed capital is not a thing 
but a process of circulation of capital through the use of material objects, such as machines.” (Limits to 
Capital, 205). It is thus only as part of a capitalist production/valorization process that a machine or tool 
constitutes fixed capital. Marx in the fragment distinguish between pre-existing instruments of production 
which become incorporated into the production process, and machinery which is the “form posited by 
capital itself and corresponding to it.” (692)  
 
24 This transformation, Marx argues “is not an accidental moment of capital, but is rather the historical 
reshaping of the traditional, inherited means of labour into a form adequate to capital.” (694) 
25 Importantly here, the (scientific) knowledge that animates and organizes this machinic production, 
Marx suggests, “does not exist in the worker's consciousness, but rather acts upon him [sic] through the 
machine as an alien power, as the power of the machine itself” (693).  
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increasingly downgraded to a diminishing moment within the larger production process. 
Through the development of the machinic form, “capital [effectively] absorbs labor into itself,” 
making workers a “mere living accessory” to a system “whose unity exists not in the living 
workers, but rather in the living (active) machinery, which confronts his individual, insignificant 
doings as a mighty organism” (693).  
The machinic tendency Marx identifies in this first part of the Fragment implies the 
increased subsumption of the entire “process of social life” to a capitalist regime of scientifically 
measured control and automated machinery.26 Posited by capital as a reflection of its own form, 
the machine comes to constitute a physical crystallization of the social division of labor (both 
presupposed and re-imposed by its functioning), blurring distinctions between forces and 
relations of production.27 The more this machinery expands, the more it seems to turn into an 
externally compelling and self-perpetuating force that confronts workers as an “alien power”, 
serving to reproduce these relations and divisions of production at an ever-expanding scale.28 
Marx here seems to outline the becoming of an accursed machinic system, residing less in the 
individual machine than in the increasing interconnectedness of machinery and workers into a 
larger productive capitalist totality.29 This ‘mighty organism’, animated by the “technological 																																																								
26 Cf. discussion on real subsumption in Marx, p. xx  
 
27 As Marx argues, the automated machine emerges to replace human labor only after a division of labor 
has already “reduced “workers’ operations into more and more mechanical ones, so that at a certain point 
a mechanism can step into their places.” (704)  
 
28 Marx writes: “the greater the scale on which fixed capital develops... the more does the continuity of 
the production process ... become an externally compelling condition for the mode of production 
founded on capital.” (703). In Limits to Capital, David Harvey reads this passage to suggest that “[t]he 
more capital circulates in fixed form, the more the system of production and consumption is locked into 
specific activities geared to the realization of fixed capital.” (LTC, 220). This passage then outlines the 
contradiction between fixed and circulating capital that will become the foundation for Harvey’s theory of 
the spatial fix. But we could also read this claim in relation to Henri Lefebvre’s argument in the Survival of 
Capitalism about how the production of space serves as primary means for reproducing the relations of 
production.   
 
29 As Marx argues, “the automatic [machine]... alone transforms machinery into a system”(692) 
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application of science”, takes on an agency and unity of its own, compelling and transforming 
everything it encounters into the service of its calculated demands for surplus extraction.  
 
4.2 The Fragment as a path to Socialist Utopia  
The start of the second section (pages ~700-712) corresponds with a shift in notebooks. Here it 
is almost as if Marx, in this momentary break brought on by the running out of pages, realizes 
that he is about to paint himself into a dystopic corner and sets out to rethink the scenario of a 
tightening grip of capital accomplished through a machinic metamorphosis. He begins by 
reopening the chasm between the machine and the social relation of capital, which he had 
sentences earlier implied was closing, reiterating the non-reducibility of the machine’s use value 
to the capital relation. For “while machinery is the most appropriate form of the use value of 
fixed capital” he writes, “ it does not at all follow that therefore subsumption under the social 
relation of capital is the most appropriate and ultimate social relation of production for the 
application of machinery.”(699)30 Rather, Marx suggests through a dialectical turn of events, in 
its tendency towards the development of an automated machinery of production, capital is in 
fact working “towards its own dissolution as the form dominating production”(700). Marx builds 
this assertion on the observation that through the development of automated systems of 
machinery, the production of “real wealth” comes to depend less and less on the expenditure of 
human labor time, and more “on the general state of science and on the progress of technology, 
or the application of this science to production”(705). In other words, through this tendency, it 
is increasingly society’s capacity to engineer new and more advanced machinery, and not the 
deployment of more workers that drives increased productivity.  																																																								
30 More specifically, Marx writes that “while capital gives itself its adequate form as use value within the 
production process only in the form of machinery and other material manifestations of fixed capital, such 
as railways etc. (to which we shall return later), this in no way means that this use value -- machinery as 
such -- is capital, or that its existence as machinery is identical with its existence as capital; any more than 
gold would cease to have use value as gold if it were no longer money. Machinery does not lose its use 
value as soon as it ceases to be capital. “(699)  
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At the same time, however, capital continues to posit human labor time as the source 
and unit of measure of value, developing machinic forces only in order to appropriate more 
surplus value (/time).31  That is, capital deploys machinery not to remove labor from the 
production process entirely, but rather intensify the rate of exploitation by increasing the ratio 
surplus to necessary labor. The contradiction here, which Marx captures in his famous falling rate 
of profit argument, is that capital achieves an intensified rate of exploitation only by replacing the 
source of value – living labor – with the dead labor congealed in machines. Thus, the capitalist 
value form appears as an increasingly “miserable foundation” for the production of wealth in the 
face of the enormous productive capacities inherent to these large-scale and automated forms of 
machinery. In fact, the development of this machinic system constitutes, according to Marx, “the 
material conditions to blow this foundation sky-high.” (706). Based on the recognition of this 
“moving contradiction” inherent in the tendency towards machination, Marx draws the 
conclusion that what must follow is an inevitable and irresolvable crisis in the capitalist law of 
value and the breakdown of “production based on exchange value,” and so of the capitalist 
mode of production at large.32 
As a complement to his break-down theory of the capitalist mode of production, Marx 
also provides a positive, utopian vision for a post-capitalist society emerging on the back of this 
increasingly machinic society: as workers are liberated from the toil of manual labor, they are 
simultaneously inserted into the production process as ‘“conscious linkages” and supervisors, 
initiating a qualitative transformation of labor from a primarily physical to an intellectual, social, 
																																																								
31 One should keep in mind here the important distinction between value and wealth in Marx, see 
footnote 49.  
 
32 Marx suggests here that “ [a]s soon as labour in the direct form has ceased to be the great well-spring of 
wealth, labour time ceases and must cease to be its measure, and hence exchange value [must cease to be 
the measure] of use value.” (705) I return to this issue below on page xx, suggesting that this crisis theory 
might potentially be challenged on several levels by Marx’s subsequent work on relative surplus value in 
Capital vol.1.  
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and cognitive activity. Through this transformation, workers become part what Marx calls a 
“general intellect”,  a distributed intelligence and living form of social knowledge that constitutes 
the most important resource for the development of automated machinic systems.33 Marx 
suggests this in a famous passage:  
Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules etc. 
These are products of human industry; natural material transformed into organs of the human 
will over nature, or of human participation in nature. They are organs of the human brain, 
created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified. The development of fixed 
capital indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of 
production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have 
come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it. (706)  
The subsumption of society to a machinic system is here posited by Marx not as a peril to 
workers’ power, but rather as a positive tendency indicating the transformation of social life into 
new and higher states of collective intelligence and subjectivity. As ‘general social knowledge’ 
replaces human labor time as the hegemonic source of wealth, it is no longer “theft of alien 
labour time”, but rather the “development of the social individual which appears as the great 
foundation-stone of production and of wealth” (705). The ‘mighty organism’ that in the first part 
of the Fragment appeared as a diabolic capitalist machine, in the second part reveals itself instead 
as the emancipatory process that will deliver the material and social basis for a post-capitalist 
society of plenty.  
Pervading the Fragment is thus, I want to argue, an indeterminacy of the dialectic where 
the same tendency towards machinic automation is described as containing the potentiality for 
two radically different outcomes –either a machinic nightmare; or a dawning socialist utopia 
																																																								
33  “The accumulation of knowledge and of skill, of the general productive forces of the social brains, is 
thus absorbed into capital, as opposed to labour, and hence appears as an attribute of capital, and more 
specifically of fixed capital, in so far as it enters into the production process as a means of production 
proper.” (694) 
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based on the collective productivity of free individuals. This ambiguous aspect of the Fragment 
has, however, been downplayed in many of the contemporary engagements with this text in 
favor of a tendential and sequential reading that poses the machinic age outlined in the first part 
as the truly (and only) revolutionary path leading to the collapse of capitalism outlined in the 
second part of the text. The obvious problem with this latter reading is that it reifies the 
machinic tendency manifested by the development of more advanced technologies and 
knowledge-based work forms as the materialization and forthcoming realization of Marx’s thesis 
on the forthcoming collapse of capitalism (see Wright 2002; Moulier-Boutang 2012). Here, the 
rapid proliferation of technologies are interpreted simply as a victorious sign of capitalism’s 
imminent demise, without however, providing any specific details as to when, or how, this 
demise will actually take place.   
To highlight this problem, we can turn to Paolo Virno, who in the 1990’s wrote about 
“the full factual realization of the tendencies described in the Grundrisse, without, however, any 
emancipatory– or even merely conflictual–reversal“(Virno 1996, 267, authors emphasis). Virno 
argued that the general intellect increasingly materialized itself as sociological reality, with 
technological and scientific innovation taking center stage in the production process, in turn 
diminishing the importance of labor time for the production of wealth. This tendency, however, 
neither lead to the end of the exploitation of human labor in the production process nor to the 
collapse of capitalism. Rather, the development of more advanced machinery, especially in the 
form of computers and communication networks, instead facilitated new modes of abstraction 
and calculation (financial industries in particular) that absorbed and stabilized the general 
intellect as part of the existing mode of production. This situation necessitated a renewed project 
of analyzing an emergent form of capitalism, but also a “fundamental critique of the fragment” 
in order to locate the emerging lines of conflictuality and contestation in this new formation 
(267). While I fully agree with Virno on this last point, I want to suggest that we must critique 
not only the Fragment itself, but also the ways that this particular text has been read into and 
  24  
  
become a central part of theorizations of our contemporary era. Next we will therefore turn to 
the tradition of post-Workerism, and its tendential reading of the Fragment as one of the 





























5. POST-WORKERISM AND MARX’S FRAGMENT 
 
Perhaps best known to contemporary readers through the work of Hardt & Negri, post-
Workerism is a rather heterogeneous school of thought constituted by a group of theorists that 
primarily share the common influence of the theoretical and political innovations emerging from 
the Italian post-WWII Marxist traditions of Operaismo (‘Workerism’) and Autonomia 
(‘Autonomism’).34 As suggested in the introduction, Hardt and Negri’s theorization of the 
contemporary metropolis must be understood in the context of this broader tradition. In this 
section, I outline the central ways in which Marx’s Fragment figures as a key reference point for 
the post-Workerist tradition, and its theorizations of present-day capitalism.35 While recognizing 
the heterogeneity of post-Workerism, I am here not so interested in delineating specific 
differences between theorists belonging to this tradition (for this kind of work, see for example 
Steve Wright’s Storming Heaven, an excellent historical overview of Operaismo and Autonomia), 
but rather to describe some of the ground they hold in common, with the Fragment constituting, 
as I will show, an important part of this ground.  
																																																								
34 From the inception of workerism (operaismo) in the late 1950’s as critique of communist party 
vanguardism, to the collapse of the autonomist movement in the late 1970’s following the kidnapping and 
assassination of the Italian prime minister Aldo Moro (see Wright 2002), this was an era that as Michael 
Hardt has suggested  “constituted a kind of laboratory for experimentation in new forms of political 
thinking” generative both a wealth of theoretical insights but also an equal number of political defeats  
(Virno and Hardt 2006, 1).  
 
35 It is interesting to note here that the fragment was translated into Italian and published in the fourth 
issue of Quaderni Rossi, the first workerist journal started in 1961 by Raniero Panzieri. Preceding the 
publication of the ‘Fragment’, Panzieri and his colleague Roman Alquati developed sophisticated critiques 
of the objectivist understanding of technology common in socialist and communist circles at the time, 
critiques that became overshadowed by the rather different approach to technology contained in the 
fragment (see Alquati 1961). I will return to these critiques below.  
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From the viewpoint of post-Workerism, contemporary capitalism is broadly 
characterized by a historical shift from material production to what different theorists refer to as 
immaterial, cognitive or biopolitical forms of production. In each of these theoretical  
articulations (to be expanded upon below), there is a specific focus on what is understood as the 
replacement of (manual) human labor with living social knowledge as the hegemonic form of 
capitalist valorisation.  Such theorizations are in large part derived through a method that 
Massimilliano Tomba (2007) has argued is common to many post-Workerist theorists:   
The method was, and is, the same: always and come what may, identifying some ‘tendency’, 
focused at its most advanced point upon a sector which assumes strategic significance, and upon 
which a new political ‘wager’ is staked. The whole theoretical system is thus politically geared 
towards new figures, declared hegemonic in the process. These figures are said to express new 
forms of conflictuality on which to place a new bet.”  
 
As prominent Workerist scholar Steve Wright has argued, this category and method of the 
‘tendency’ is derived from Antonio Negri’s extremely influential reading of the Grundrisse (and 
the Fragment in particular): 36  
Central to Negri's reading of the Grundrisse was his appropriation of the category tendency, by 
which he understood the historical unfolding of capital's immanent contradictions as social 
antagonisms. The tendency was 'in no sense a necessary and ineluctable law governing reality', 
but rather 'a general schema' that 'defines a method, an orientation, a direction for mass political 
action' (ibid.: 125). (Wright, 139)” 
This method of the tendency then, has generally led post-Workerist theorists to focus on what 
they conceive of as the latest and highest points of capitalist development (and figures at the 
center of such development) as constituting the most important strategic point of resistance. In 
the following section I will delineate more specifically three interrelated ways in which the 																																																								
36 The tendency in Marx’s Grundrisse: “The increase of the productive force of labor and the greatest 
possible negation of necessary labor is the necessary tendency of capital, as we have seen. The 
transformation of the means of labor into machinery is the realization of this tendency.”  (693)  
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tendential reading of the Fragment figures as the basis for the post-Workerist characterization of 
contemporary capitalism. First, I will show how the Fragment functions as the ground for 
establishing a periodization of the capitalist mode of production, including what is seen as its 
latest phase, here referred to under the umbrella term of cognitive capitalism. Secondly, I will 
point to how the Fragment provides the basis for a theory of the contemporary primacy of social 
cooperation, and its autonomy from the organizational capacities of capital. And finally, I will 
argue that a tendential reading of the Fragment constitutes a key part of post-Workerist theories 
of capitalist crisis. In all three cases, I will critically interrogate the reductionist aspects of such 
tendential theorizations derived from Marx’s Fragment, pointing towards the importance of 
relational and contextually grounded forms of analysis that situate specific tendencies within the 
broader and more complex landscapes of social, political and economic processes from which 
they derive.  
 
5.1 The Fragment and The Era of Cognitive Capitalism  
First, I want to point the role that a tendential reading of the Fragment plays for the post-
Workerist historical periodization of capitalism. This periodization provides the basis for the 
argument that we have entered a third era or phase of capitalism often referred to as cognitive 
capitalism. For Carlo Vercellone (2007), one of the main theorists of cognitive capitalism, this 
periodization is built more specifically on a synthetic reading of Marx’s notions of formal 
subsumption, real subsumption and the general intellect. These concepts, which in Marx reflect different 
levels of subsumption of labor to the capital relation (with each level of subsumption 
corresponding to a specific organizational mode of capitalist production), are conceived by 
Vercellone as historical stages of capitalist development.37 Formal and real subsumption are 																																																								
37 According to the workerist and post-workerist tradition, the emergence of a new form of subsumption 
of labor to capital is driven not by some inherent progressive force of capitalism but rather by workers 
struggle. For post-Workerists it is, in other words, the struggle of workers against capitalist domination 
that prompted the technological and organizational transformations that led to the real subsumption of 
labor, and it is similarly workers’ struggle against the regimented organization of labor under Fordist 
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concepts discussed by Marx particularly in the unpublished 6th chapter of Capital, whereas the 
idea of the general intellect is, as we now know, taken from the Fragment on Machines.38 While 
the latter is of particular interest here, we must begin by briefly introducing the notions of formal 
and real subsumption in order to grasp the nature of this argument.  
Formal subsumption designates the incorporation of laboring practices and subjects under 
the capitalist valorization process, often through what Marx calls primitive or original 
accumulation. Under formal subsumption, the production process is still (at least in part) 
organized and managed by the workers themselves, while capital merely takes hold of this 
production ‘formally’ through ownership of the means of production and mechanisms such as 
the wage relation. Capital is able to accumulate surplus by extending the working day beyond 
what is socially necessary for the reproduction of workers. Formal subsumption is thus primarily 
extensive, that is, it consists of subsuming more workers/extending the absolute number of 
hours worked, and is closely related to the notion of absolute surplus value .39 
Real subsumption, by contrast, is a function of an industrialized form of capitalism and 
involves subsuming the majority of labor under the direct organizational and technological 
supervision of capital, driving a more intentional and stratified division of labor. Real 
subsumption is characterized by a reduction from complex to simple labor; an increased 
domination of the living labor of workers by the dead labor in machines – closely related to the 
image that Marx draws of a machinic society in the first part of the ‘fragment; and by the 
retention of intellectual and knowledge-production within a small managerial portion of the 
workforce (Vercellone 2007, 15f). Real subsumption is thus intensive (it functions by increasing 																																																																																																																																																																												
industrialism that forced the crisis of this model of real subsumption, and pushed for the subsequent 
emergence of cognitive capitalism. 
38 See: Results of the Direct Production Process (Marx 1864)  
 
39 On absolute surplus value, see p 30. An often used example of formal subsumption is the so called  
‘putting-out system’ common under early days of capitalism, where capitalists would supply workers with 
tools and materials to their homes and then pick up the finished products for sale (giving rise to what 
became known as the cottage industries). 
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the rate rather than absolute amount of exploitation), and relates primarily to the notion of 
relative surplus value in Marx.40  
Against this background, the emergence of the ‘general intellect’ is suggested by post-
Workerists as heralding a transformation (or third form) of subsumption related to the historical 
emergence of cognitive capitalism (Vercellone 2007). The ‘general intellect’ is, as we have seen, a 
moment described by Marx in the Fragment when “general social knowledge” becomes a direct 
and increasingly dominant force in capitalist production. This happens as a consequence of the 
tendency towards increasing machinic automation and the growing importance of science to the 
production process. The general intellect is, in the post-Workerist reading, understood as 
collective or distributed intelligence constituted by the social cooperation and social practice of 
the population at large. Due to its immaterial and social character, the general intellect, unlike 
factory labor, is said to stand outside the direct organizational control of capitalists. It thereby 
effectively generates a break with (Vercellone), or a deepening and generalized crisis of (Hardt & 
Negri), the real subsumption of labor characteristic of industrial/Fordist production. This third 
era of capitalism is thus characterized by an increasing autonomy of socialized knowledge 
production vis-à-vis direct capitalist control, leading some to argue that as a consequence, capital 
is in fact forced to return to a modified form of formal subsumption of labor and to “mercantile 
and financial mechanisms of accumulation”. (Vercellone 2007, 16) A tendential reading of the 
Fragment, as we see here, provides an important part of the theoretical armament used by post-
Workerists in their reconceptualization of post-industrial/information society as cognitive 
capitalism.  
With the concept of cognitive capitalism finding its way into the discipline of geography 
in recent years – Allen J. Scott has for example mobilized this concept to explain the emergent 
characteristic of 21st century urban economic geography (Scott 2007; Scott 2008; Scott 2011) – 
																																																								
40 On relative surplus value, see p. 30 
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clarifying the underlying roots of this periodization argument in a tendential reading of the 
Fragment becomes essential.  
The Fragment also lays the foundation for post-Workerist theories on the primacy of 
cognitive cooperation, and capitalist crisis. But before elaborating these subsequent points, I 
want to briefly note here that this historicist and tendential reading of the Fragment remains a 
matter of debate, even within post-Workerist circles. Sandro Mezzadra has, for example, 
cautioned against such readings, drawing on his work on migration and border struggles to argue 
that:  
[a] careful analysis of migrant labour challenges this way of reading the history and present of 
capitalism, showing the coexistence of formal and real subsumption, of ‘immaterial’ and forced 
labour. This brings to the fore the structural nexus between the ‘new economy’ and new forms of 
‘so-called primitive accumulation’, along with the new enclosures that this structural nexus 
entails. (Mezzadra 2011, 10) 
For Mezzadra, each level of subsumption and the related organizational model of capitalist 
accumulation should not be seen as mutually exclusive or as sequentially eclipsing the form that 
preceded it. Rather, he argues, we must focus precisely on the co-existence of formal and real 
subsumption of labor under the emergence of cognitive capitalism without falling into any 
teleological narratives of one replacing another. We will return to this cautionary critique and 
how it articulates the importance paying more careful attention to the differential relation 
between production forms under contemporary capitalism.      
 
5.2 The Fragment as a theory of Cognitive Cooperation  
The fragment constitutes an important basis for the thesis that Alberto Toscano has called 
“the primacy of cooperation,” which posits “the autonomy of the cooperative capacities of 
living, immaterial labour from their expropriation and commoditization by informational 
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capitalism” (Toscano 2007, 75).41 This is a position that Hardt & Negri, together with Lazzarato, 
Vercellone and a number of post-Workerists, can all be said to in different ways subscribe to. In 
Labor of Dionysus, Toni Negri outlines this position more specifically:  
Cooperation, or the association of [cyborg] producers, is posed independently of the 
organization capacity of capital; the cooperation and subjectivity of labor have found a 
point of contact outside of the machinations of capital. Capital becomes merely an 
apparatus of capture, a phantasm, an idol. Around it move radically autonomous 
processes of self-valorization that not only constitute an alternative basis of potential 
development but also actually represent a new constituent foundation. (Hardt and Negri 
1994, 282; quoted in Caffentzis 2013, 77) 
Negri’s position here is clearly inspired by his tendential reading of Marx’s Fragment, with a 
particular emphasis put on the second part of the text and its notion of the general intellect as 
the cooperation of free individuals. For after delineating what seems like an increasing 
peripherialization of human capacities from the production process in the first part of the 
fragment, Marx in the second part re-centers precisely on how this machinic tendency leads to 
the general development of the creative and innovative capacities of the social individual, which 
now constitutes a key to the production of wealth in a society filled with automated machinery.42 
In the post-Workerist reading of the Fragment, the emergence of this higher form of productive 
sociality is intimately connected to the subsumption of social life to the technological networks 
																																																								
41 This position is perhaps best understood as building on and merging two ideas; on the one hand the 
idea, dating back to Mario Tronti on the primacy of working class struggle as the driver of the 
development of capitalism; and on the other hand, a reading of Marx's Fragment on Machines that 
suggests shift towards knowledge, science and information becoming hegemonic to capitalist valorization.  
 
42 For as he argues in the passage quoted above: “[n]ature builds not machines…  [t]hey are organs of the 
human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified”(Marx 1993, 706). 
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of automated machines.43 But the emergent productivity of immaterial labor (based on social 
collaboration and communication) means that the production of wealth is now no longer tied to 
the theft of labor time, but rather to the further development of “free individualities” that can 
partake in such processes. This transformation is in the post-Workerist reading is seen as the 
basis for an increasing autonomy of a process (of social life) which they argue cannot be 
controlled by capital in the same way that material factory labor can.  
To see this position at work, we can return to Hardt & Negri’s theorization of the 
biopolitical metropolis. Immaterial production based on living social knowledge, they argue in 
Commonwealth, cannot not be easily confined to certain spaces and times (as was the case with 
factory production during the Fordist industrial era) but rather comes to spread “throughout the 
entire social territory”, increasingly overlapping with “the life of the city itself” (244).44 Because it 
is comprised directly in collective urban sociality (rather than through the supervised encounter 
between machines and manual labor), immaterial and biopolitical forms of production enjoy an 
increasing autonomy from the direct organizational intervention of capital. As a result of this 
increasing autonomy capital is transformed from a profit-producing to a metropolitan rent-
extracting machine, “which is [now] the only means by which [it] can capture the wealth created 
autonomously”(Hardt and Negri 2009, 251). The emerging form of the contemporary 
metropolis is characterized, for Hardt & Negri, as we have already seen, by the growing 
antagonism between these two different processes, on the one hand the metropolis as a site for 
the productivity of autonomous social labor, and on the other hand the metropolis as an 																																																								
43 As Marx states: [t]he development of fixed capital indicates … to what degree  …the conditions of the 
process of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in 
accordance with it”) (ibid 706).   
 
44 The term biopolitical production is used by Hardt & Negri to capture precisely how production 
increasingly overlaps with life itself, blurring the distinction between production and reproduction.  As 
such, it attempts to broaden the categories of immaterial and cognitive production/labor commonly used 
within the post-Workerist tradition beyond the figure of the knowledge worker by drawing on Michel 
Foucault’s work on biopolitics and biopower. But we might also see here how this argument lies close to 
Marx’s point in the fragment on how capital increasingly comes to subsume the “process of social life” 
itself. 
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apparatus of rent extraction that facilitates the increasingly parasitic practices of capitalist 
valorization.  
 However, as Alberto Toscano has argued, we might question this optimistic position on a 
primacy of (urban) cognitive cooperation by pointing to “the forced nature of much social and 
cognitive interaction, of the manner in which the imperative ‘connect!’ might be experienced as a 
violent imposition on the part of capitalism rather than anything arising out of the desire of a 
putative multitude” (2007, 79-80) The recognition of this problematic leads Toscano to ask:  
… in what sense we are justified in speaking simply of ‘capture’: are we not dealing with the 
incitement by capitalism of a simulacrum of self-valorization, an ideology of cooperation which 
would mistake a global constraint for a subjective initiative? Is cooperation really outside, or even 
relatively autonomous from, the self-valorization of capital? (2007, 80)  
Toscano’s questioning of the increasing autonomy of cognitive and immaterial labor, and the 
suggestion that we must take seriously the notion of a machinic imperative to 
connect/communicate, resonates strongly with the bleak anticipations of a machinic society that 
Marx outlines in the first part of the Fragment.45 While Marx primarily saw this in relation to the 
development of the factory space and the changing conditions of labor for factory workers, we 
might today make a similar point about the development of the networked metropolis and the 
conditions of an urban multitude, and through this question the claim that capital lacks the 
ability to organize immaterial forms of production. For what is the networked metropolis if not a 
machinic imperative to constantly connect?46 																																																								
45 Here, ubiquitous automated technologies are not seen to increase, but rather reduce autonomy, with 
“workers activity…  [increasingly] determined on all sides by the movement of the machinery, and not 
the opposite” (Marx 1993, 693). 
 
46 We can make this shift on the basis of Hardt & Negri’s claim that the metropolis has replaced the 
factory as the primary site of production. It is interesting here to draw a parallell to Deleuze’s discussion 
on the emergence of a control society, which constitutes a shift from a society that operates through 
confinment, to one that operates “through continuous control and instant communication.”. In an 
interview with Toni Negri from 1990, Deleuze therefore warns against the universialization of 
communication and communication technologies, suggesting instead that what is needed ”may be to 
create vacuoles of non-communication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control.” (Deleuze 1990) 
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5.3 The Fragment as a Theory of Capitalist Crisis  
Finally, the Fragment provides a model of capitalist crisis commonly adopted by post-Workerist 
theorists built on the idea that capital (and its notion of value) is becoming an increasingly 
“miserable foundation” for production based on the general intelligence of a social network 
(Marx 1993, 705). “Capital is crisis”, Sandro Mezzadra for example writes in the introduction to 
Crisis in the Global Economy, a recent collection of post-Workerist commentaries on the crisis 
of 2008 (Fumagalli and Mezzadra 2010, 13). The crisis signals “the exhaustion of the progressive 
force of capital”, Carlo Vercellone adds in a later chapter of the same volume, an exhaustion 
which is seen to stem more specifically from the “irreconcilable character of cognitive capitalism 
with the social conditions at the root of the development of an economy founded on 
knowledge” (Vercellone 2010, 90).47 This constitutes for Vercellone and other post-Workerists, 
the structural characteristics of the contemporary crisis; an indication of the growing 
contradiction between the emerging productiveness of the “general intellect”, and the 
increasingly exterior and parasitic mechanisms of capturing value from this social production 
through what Vercellone describes as the proliferation of rents. The latter is, for Vercellone, 
inevitably undermining the conditions of growth for the former by imposing artificial forms of 
scarcity and very real conditions of precarity as means of control over a social form of 
production that is seen to become increasingly autonomous from the standpoint of capital. 
(Vercellone). Importantly, this diagnosis suggests that capital is no longer a dynamic force that 
organizes the production of wealth (if only through exploitative and violent means), but is 
instead increasingly seen as a barrier standing in the way of the full realization of the 
autonomously productive capacities of a distributed and collective social intelligence.  
 This is a model of crisis that, as we can see, draws crucially on a tendency derived from 
Marx’s Fragment. It does so, we might propose, in at least two distinct ways. First, it suggest a 																																																								
47 Cognitive capitalism represents here, not a new stable form of accumulation, as much as a desperate 
attempt to reinstate an appearance of cohesion and stability to an overall system that is becoming 
increasingly fragmented and unstable.  
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tendency towards a generalized antagonism between the autonomous productive capacities of 
the contemporary general intellect, and the parasitic nature of capital which increasingly becomes 
a barrier to these capacities (cf. Marx 1993, 706). And secondly, it suggests that this tendency 
exposes the increasing bankruptcy of the labor theory of value, which Marx suggests in the 
Fragment, must cease to be valid when labor time is replaced by general social knowledge as the 
“great foundation-stone of production and of wealth”(ibid, 705).   
 
5.4 Critique of the Fragment as Crisis theory and the Notion of Relative Surplus Value 
As we have just seen then, the post-Workerist tradition relies importantly on the 
Fragment on Machines to provide a form of breakdown theory of capitalism based on the 
contradiction that Marx identified between “the tendency to reduce labor time to a minimum 
while, on the other hand, positing labour time as the sole measure and source of wealth.” (Marx 
quoted in Heinrich, 212)” It is drawing on this contradiction outlined in the Fragment that Negri 
and others suggest a “crisis in the law of value”, and assert with confidence that the emergence 
of ‘general social knowledge’ as a direct force of production signals the beginning of the end for 
the capitalist mode of production (see Vercellone 2010).  
However, as Michael Heinrich has argued, we should be careful with reading the 
Fragment’s crisis theory out of its context in the development in Marx’s thought. At the time of 
writing the Grundrisse, Marx had still not fully developed the basic categories of his critique of 
political economy and was still partially operating within the categories given by bourgeois 
economics. This meant, Heinrich suggests, that Marx could not yet solve the riddle of why 
capitalists would strive to diminish labor time spent in the production process while at the same 
time positing labor time as the primary measure of value. Based on empirical observations of the 
increased application of science and machinery in the production process, and the diminishing 
role of ‘immediate labor’ in this same process, Marx was led in the Fragment to draw the 
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(according to Heinrich) premature conclusion that this indicated nothing less than that capitalism 
was working towards its own imminent self-destruction.48 
When Marx later returned to the issue in Capital he would, however, no longer argue that 
the increased use of automation and techno-science in the production process implied the 
necessary disappearance of abstract human labor as source or adequate measure of value. So 
what had changed? Heinrich’s explanation is that when writing the Grundrisse, Marx was still 
lacking “an adequate concept of the production of relative surplus-value.“ (Heinrich 2013, 206). 
Once in place in Marx’s theoretical apparatus, the distinction between absolute and relative 
surplus value provided a justification both for the increased use of machinery in the production 
process, as well as for why this tendency was not inevitably going to do away with the centrality 
of human labor for capitalist valorization. 
 In order to understand this argument, we must begin with a basic definition of the two 
terms. Absolute surplus value in Marx is constituted by that which is produced for capital by 
workers beyond the value of their labor-power. The production of absolute surplus value, Marx 
says, “ turns exclusively upon the length of the working-day” (Marx 1992, Ch. 16), and an 
increase in the amount of absolute surplus value can thus only be achieved by increasing the 
number of hours worked. Relative surplus value, by contrast, is derived from an intensification 
and increased productivity of the labor process through the introduction of machinery and 
scientifically coordinated divisions of labor and/or the reduction of the cost of labor power. 
Instead of prolonging the absolute number of hours worked, the production of relative surplus 
																																																								
48 Heinrich gives an additional explanation as to why Marx at the time was led to draw this conclusion.  
During the 1850’s Marx was still operating with a “one-sided” and fairly limited understanding of crisis, 
conceiving of capitalist crisis as the final moment that would bring about its collapse and lead to socialist 
revolution. In 1857, during the very time that Marx was writing the Grundrisse, what has been called the 
first world economic crisis unraveled across an increasingly interconnected connected world market. This 
led Marx to rush his work to produce a theoretical justification for the crisis and how it indicated 
exhaustion of the capitalist system and the coming socialist revolution(s).  But unlike Marx had predicted, 
the crisis passed and no revolutions happened. This disappointing outcome, Heinrich suggests, taught 
Marx an important lesson, explaining his more cautious approach in Capital to the contradiction which he 
in the Fragment had suggest held the potential “to blow this [capitalist] foundation sky-high”. 
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value involves a relative extension of the hours of productive labor appropriated by capital 
through an increased rate of exploitation.  
Based on the distinction between absolute and relative surplus value, Marx was able to 
see that the same process that reduces the necessary human labor time used in the immediate 
process of production by means of technical innovation (the tendency that he had in the 
Fragment identified as suggesting the vanishing role of human labor in general), at the same time 
augments “the social value of the article produced above its individual value.” (Marx Capital Vol. 
1, Ch. 15 3b)  Remember here Marx’s social conceptualization of value - “not as the 
objectification of labour immediately spent in the production of a determinate commodity, but 
as an expression of the quantity of social labour objectified in the commodity.” (Tomba 2007, 
29). The value objectified in a commodity is thus determined not by the quantity of concrete 
amount of labor used to produce it, but rather by the social average quantity of labor time 
needed to produce such a commodity at any specific time. The capitalist who introduces 
machinery in the production process can potentially reduce the amount of labor spent in the 
production of a specific commodity below the socially necessary average, thereby generating a 
relative increase in the surplus value that can be realized through sale of this commodity. The key 
point here is that this relative surplus value generated through increased automation of 
production, as Massimiliano Tomba argues: 
 “is relative … because it, to be real, must be placed in relation to absolute surplus value. To the 
extent to which the capitalist that takes advantage of a technological innovation realizes at least a 
part of the relative surplus value that is potentially his [sic], this surplus value takes form through 
a social transfer of value from productive areas of high absolute surplus value towards those of 
high relative surplus value. The relative increase in the labour productivity and of the surplus 
value in some sectors of production leads to a de-valorization of labour-power that could also 
manifest itself as growth of the exploitation of reproduction work – whether waged or unwaged. 
(Tomba 2007, 32) “  
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The concept of relative surplus value thereby posits the necessary reciprocity between on 
the one hand the extension of technologically enhanced production, which produces relative 
surplus value, and on the other an increase in the production and appropriation of absolute 
surplus value based on the extension of labor time. While the introduction of machinery can 
increase the rate of surplus value extraction within a given amount of labor time by amplifying 
the productiveness of labor, “it is clear that it attains this result, only by diminishing the number 
of workmen employed by a given amount of capital. It converts what was formerly variable 
capital, invested in labour-power, into machinery which, being constant capital, does not 
produce surplus-value.” (Capital Vol. 1, Ch. 15 3b). As for Marx, the only source of surplus-
value is variable capital (human labor), the introduction of more machinery at one point thus has 
to be compensated for by an increase in the extraction of absolute surplus value somewhere else.49 
Additionally, it is important to note here how the development of machinery in production also 
leads to a cheapening of labor power (both by working as a form of coercion, but also by 
reducing the cost of reproduction), which creates a counter-tendency to further automation.  
Machines will, in other words, not be introduced indiscriminately into the production process, 
but only when they actually reduce production costs relative the socially necessary average 
(machines are expensive!). This primacy of the profit-motive thus constitutes an additional check 
on the tendency identified in the Fragment towards the substitution of machines for human 
labor. 
																																																								
49  One should keep in mind here the key distinction between wealth and value in Marx.  In the case of 
wealth, Tony Smith argues, capitalism has ”always crucially depended upon ‘free gifts’ that capital claimed 
as its own” (natural, but also the unrecognized social ones) and as he adds  “[t]he causal role of these 
sorts of factors in the production of wealth has always been incalculably large, and so there has never 
been a period of capitalism in which embodied labour served as the proper measure of wealth.” (Smith in 
Bellofiore et al. 2013)  The labor theory of value developed by Marx was, however, never about 
measuring wealth, but rather value, the social form of wealth under capitalism. In other words, it is value, 
and not wealth that takes abstract human labor as its measure. This distinction, in somewhat simplified 
terms, is what allows for the simultaneous growth in the production of material wealth through the 
scientific augmentation of the production process, and the continued use of socially necessary labor time 
as measure value within capitalism. 
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Why then take up the category of relative surplus value in relation to a set of theories 
that proclaim the contemporary bankruptcy of the labor theory of value? Surely, those that argue 
the contemporary obsolescence Marx’s value theory have both time and plenty of examples on 
their side. However, I want to emphasize here that the present critical interrogation of the crisis 
theory outlined in the Fragment (and encapsulated in post-Workerist method of the tendency), is 
neither an attempt to reinstate Marx’s value theory tout court, nor to suggest a linear 
development of Marx’s thought where latter writings simply disqualify or trump the content of 
his earlier works. Rather, the point is to show that Marx continued to work through the issues 
that he encountered in the Fragment, eventually coming up with a number of insights that 
complicated his earlier conclusions. This again does not mean to say that Marx in these later 
works was automatically more correct in his analysis, or produced a solution more adequate for 
us today. Rather, it points to the importance of “retrac[ing] Marx’s gesture, that is, to pose once 
again the problem that is inside the question of value” (Tomba 2007, 26). The value of Marx’s 
value theory today is to be found not in the provision of an objective definition of value, but 
rather in how it helps us to pose the question of value and interrogate it as a historically and 
spatially contingent social/political problem.  
By insisting, as we have seen, on the necessary reciprocity between high and low organic 
composition of labor, between technologically advanced and raw forms of labor exploitation, the 
category of relative surplus value retains significance in contemporary formulations of the 
problem of value, not as an absolute category, but rather through its emphasis on the relational 
and synchronous (rather than diachronic) nature of different forms of subsumption of labor to 
capital. It thus helps us to see how “capitalist accumulation has thrived precisely through its 
capacity to simultaneously organize development and underdevelopment, waged and un–waged 
labor, production at the highest levels of technological know–how and production at the lowest 
levels.” (G. Caffentzis and Federici 2007).  While post-Workerist theories of cognitive capitalism 
and immaterial labor raise important questions about (some of) the limitations of Marx’s value 
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theory for understanding new and emergent forms of production and exploitation, the theory of 
relative surplus value directs attention to the problem of the contemporaneous co-existence of 
such emergent or tendential forms with the continuation (and intensification) of other raw and 
violent forms of exploitation and dispossession (including neo-slavery, land grabbing etc.). As 
such, it poses a both important and necessary counterpoint to those that in their historicist 
proclamation of the tendential hegemony of immaterial and cognitive forms of labour, are prone 
to treat other exploitative and dispossessive forms as residual remains of a bygone age, rather 
than as fully complementary aspects of contemporary global capitalism.  
The example of Uber, taken from the epigraph, can serve to highlight this point. For on 
the one hand, Uber appears as a success story of entrepreneurs who through their intellectual 
and innovative labor, combined with the new possibilities of ubiquitous digital technologies, 
have created a smartphone application that has become a global phenomenon (the latest rounds 
of investments in 2015 valued Uber at $51 billion). On the other hand, however, we can see that 
this ‘success’ is directly connected to the intensified exploitation of tens of thousands of low-
income service workers who become defined as self-employed “micro-entrepreneurs” (meaning 
that they bear even more risk, having less security than in the already notoriously exploitative taxi 
sector). On the one hand, Uber seems to exemplify the remarkable productivity of immaterial 
production. On the other hand, we see how this productivity derives from the depreciation of an 
entire service sector as prices (but not profits) are being cut, leading to increased precarity among 
workers who often have few other options for selling their labor on the labor market.  
The value of Marx’s relational value theory here is that it pushes us to look beyond the 
appearance of machinic and intellectual productivity, only to discover an often intensified 
exploitation of human labor. For as among others Massimo De Angelis has argued, one of the 
problems with tendential categories such as cognitive capitalism and immaterial labor is that they 
do not helps us to decipher the new global hierarchies instilled through these communicative 
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forms of global capitalism.50 That is, they conceal the fact that tendency towards immaterial 
labor, as we can see clearly through the example of Uber, involves the emergence of new social 
(and spatial) stratifications (Angelis 2006, 169). 
To make this point, however, we do not have to limit ourselves to the perspectives of 
strong defenders of Marx’s value theory. In the great chapter on the “Civilized Capitalist 
Machine” in Anti-Oedipus (1983), Deleuze & Guattari draw on Marx’s Fragment to introduce the 
category of “machinic surplus value”, which they suggest cannot be reduced to the value 
transfers implied by the theory of relative surplus value.51 Machinic surplus value, which stems 
from the creative and innovative capacities of the ‘general intellect’, thus represents a clear break 
with Marx’s labor theory of value. However, unlike in the post-Workerist theories of cognitive 
capitalism and immaterial labor, the ‘revisionism’ of Deleuze & Guattari does not lead them to 
abandon or dismiss the impetus of Marx’s value theory in its entirety. Rather they argue for the 
continued importance: 
“of human surplus value … even at the center and in highly industrialized sectors. What 
determines the lowering of costs and the elevation of the rate of profit through machinic surplus 
value is not innovation itself, whose value is no more measurable than that of human surplus 
value. It is not even the profitability of the new technique considered in isolation, but its effect 
on the over-all profitability of the firm in its relationships with the market and with commercial 
and financial capital. “(233) 
While departing from the strictures of the labor theory of value (and its humanistic 
implications), Deleuze and Guattari importantly retain an emphasis on the differential and 
relational character of value as determined by a social totality not reducible to any singular point 
																																																								
50 I want to clarify here that I do not make that claim that, for example, De Angelis represents an 
orthodox supporter of Marx’s value theory.  
 
51 For recent discussion of this concept in Deleuze & Guattari, see Pasquinelli (2015). 
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or tendency.52 They carefully avoid the reification of innovation and technological progress, 
suggesting a co-constitutive relationship between the emergence “the most progressive and the 
most automated sectors” at the core, and “a veritable “development of underdevelopment” in 
the periphery.53 For the latter, they argue “ensures a rise in the rate of surplus value, in the form 
of an increasing exploitation of the peripheral proletariat in relation to that of the center” (231).54  
So while machines are recognized as productive of value, it is nevertheless precisely through the 
reproduction of the  “differential relation[s]” between technically advanced centers and highly 
exploitative peripheries that Deleuze & Guattari’s capitalist machine is able to continue its 
expansion. And as they warn, in what appears as a critical anticipation of the thesis on the 
increasing autonomy of immaterial labor; “by no means does [this capitalist machine] confer on 
its scientists and its technicians an independence that was unknown in the previous regimes” 
(233). The development of technical machines, they argue, is primarily organized for the benefit 
of the social capitalist machine, and not the other way around.  
 In this section, I have outlined some different ways in which the post-Workerist tradition 
																																																								
52 In contrast to those theorists who argue for the specific immeasurability of value under cognitive 
capitalism [source], Deleuze & Guattari imply that this measurement problem is not new (‘human surplus 
value is no more measurable than innovation’), but has rather always been at the heart of capitalism as a 
deterritorializing and decoding machine. Capitalism for Deleuze & Guattari functions as an axiomatic that 
allows for the calculation and extraction of surplus value from the manifold differential conjunctions of 
decoded and deterritorialized flows of capital and labor. Using a common unit of measure for these two 
flows, they argue equates to “pure fiction, a cosmic swindle”, because “there is no common measure 
between the value of the enterprises and that of the labor capacity of wage earners.” It is precisely 
capitalism’s capacity to extract surplus from connecting such incommensurable flows that bestows it with 
such flexibility and resilience, suggesting that a problem of measuring value of collective social knowledge 
does not for Deleuze and Guattari, as for some others, correspond to an inevitable termination point or 
“exterior limit” for the capitalist mode of production.  
 
53 It is worth noting here that they emphasize the existence of such processes at different scales, where 
peripheries develop also within the centers themselves.  
 
54 And as they importantly add: “it would be a great error to think that exports from the periphery 
originate primarily in traditional sectors or archaic territorialities : on the contrary, they come from 
modern industries and plantations that generate an immense surplus value, to a point where it is no 
longer the developed countries that supply the underdeveloped countries with capital, but quite the 
opposite. So true is it that primitive accumulation is not produced just once at the dawn of capitalism, but 
is continually reproducing itself.” (231)  
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has mobilized a tendential reading of Marx’s Fragment as the basis for a theorization of 
contemporary capitalism. I have also introduced a number of critiques that delineate some of the 
limitations of such tendential theorizations, and have argued for the importance of concepts and 
frameworks sensitive to relationality more broadly.  Next, I want to suggest that we can find 
promising grounds for developing such frameworks within the early history of workerism itself. 
First, however, I turn to a recent theoretical fad known as accelerationism, which through its 
more programmatic character allows us to more clearly interrogate some of the political 
























6. ACCELERATIONISM AND THE PROBLEM OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
We believe the most important division in today’s left is between those that hold to a 
folk politics of localism, direct action, and relentless horizontalism, and those that outline 
what must become called an accelerationist politics at ease with a modernity of 
abstraction, complexity, globality, and technology.” (Srnicek and Williams 2013).   
 
The material platform of neoliberalism does not need to be destroyed. It needs to be 
repurposed towards common ends. The existing infrastructure is not a capitalist stage to 
be smashed, but a springboard to launch towards post-capitalism.” (ibid).   
 
Accelerationism is a concept and strand of political theorization that has generated significant 
debate in recent years following the publication of Nick Srnicek’s and Alex William’s Manifesto for 
an Accelerationist Politics in 2013 (see Srnicek & Williams 2013; Noys 2010, 2014; Mackay & 
Avanessian 2014; Negri 2014; Pasquinelli 2014).55 Accelerationism presents itself as a theoretical 
																																																								
55 The term accelerationism was originally devised by Benjamin Noys in his book The Persistence of the 
Negative (2010), to connote a particular affirmationist tendency within French and to a certain extent 
Italian counter cultural theory emerging in the wake of 1968. What the accelerationists affirm, Noys 
argues, “is the capitalist power of dissolution and fragmentation, which must always be taken one step 
further to break the fetters of capital itself.” While Noys conceived of accelerationism in primarily 
negative terms to suggest that accelerationists had mistaken the 1970’s post-Fordist reorganization of 
capitalist accumulation for signs of its immanent self-implosion, the concept has since been picked up by 
a number of other scholars who have redeployed it in more positive and politically programmatic forms 
(cf. Srnicek & Williams 2013, Mackay & Avanessian 2014).  One of the key reference points for this 
position is a section from Deleuze & Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, in which they build on their idea of 
capitalism as a deterritorializing and reterritorializing machine to suggest that perhaps “the flows are not 
yet deterritorialized enough?,” and so the truly revolutionary path would be “[n]ot to withdraw from the 
process, but to go further, to “accelerate the process.” (239-240).  Deleuze & Guattari’s call for 
acceleration, implies then, according to its recent interpreters, that there is no longer any tenable 
possibility of breaking free or retreating from capitalism (Deleuze & Guattari’s idea of acceleration was 
posed specifically against Samir Amin’s call for decolonizing countries to withdraw from the capitalist 
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and political intervention at a moment of generalized crisis and “coming apocalypses” These 
crises, accelerationists argue, are the result not only of the intensifying onslaught of 
neoliberalized creative destruction and the haunting return of the externalized costs of fossil-
fueled capitalist globalization, but also of the “inability” of the political and academic left “to 
generate the new ideas and modes of organization necessary to transform our societies to 
confront and resolve the coming annihilations” (Srnicek and Williams 2013, 2) This malaise of 
the contemporary left, is blamed largely on a fetishization of horizontalism and localism, 
combined with an exaggerated suspicion of technology, abstraction and reason.  
 What if, accelerationists ask, the path towards overcoming the capitalist world system is 
to be found not in the rejection of modernity, development and technocratic planning, but rather 
in the reappropriation of these projects for different ends?  What if, as Srnicek & Williams imply 
in the epigraph to this section, the realization of post-capitalism involves not separating from, or 
simply smashing the infrastructural landscape of neoliberal capitalism, but rather thoughtfully 
strategizing to take it over from within? What if we could “preserve the gains of late capitalism 
while going further than its value system, governance structures, and mass pathologies will allow 
[?]”(Srnicek and Williams 2013).  And what if, instead of trenchantly fighting against them, we 
would push existing political, social and technological tendencies of ‘creative destruction’ to the 
point where they would break the fetters imposed by a capitalist system always in need of 
imposing new borders and boundaries?  
 For Accelerationists, Marx– with his optimistic attitude towards capitalism’s 
unprecedented capacity for dissolution and abstraction, and his fascination for the enormous 
productive forces unleashed by the unholy alliance between techno-scientific innovation and 
capitalist accumulation – represents a form of Ur-accelerationist. And within his larger body of 																																																																																																																																																																												
world system). This option, Accelerationists argue, has been foreclosed upon, and as they are quick to 
add, it would not be desirable to go back anyway. Rather, “the only way ‘out’ is to plunge further in” 
while seeking the “immanent radicalization” of capitalism’s own dynamic of abstraction, decoding and 
deterritorialization, to co-opt it from within and push further (See Mackay and Avanessian 2014, 13) . 
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work, the Fragment on Machines is identified as his “perhaps most openly accelerationist 
writing”(Mackay and Avanessian 2014, 9). The Fragment, with its narrative of machinic 
subsumption as the harbinger of capitalism’s coming collapse, is, in other words, read by 
accelerationists as a text that first institutes technological acceleration as a political imaginary.56   
 However, accelerationism is interesting here not only for its engagement with Marx’s 
Fragment, but also for two other reasons. For what accelerationism offers is, in many ways, an 
intensification and extension of certain aspects of the post-Workerist theories discussed above. 
Accelerationism takes its starting point in the identification of a growing antagonism between the 
enormous productive potentialities of the contemporary socio-technical landscape and the value-
form of capital (see Mackay & Avanessian 2014; Negri 2014). However, at a moment of 
mounting crises, Accelerationists argue that we can’t afford to wait for capitalism to undermine 
itself, but that we must actively and strategically accelerate certain tendencies that can aggravate 
already existing tensions. In this sense, accelerationism can be said to be more politically 
programmatic, pushing the tendential implications of post-Workerism to their limits.57  As Toni 
Negri has approvingly suggested in a recent comment on the Accelerationist manifesto, - “Some 
of us perceive [accelerationism] as an Anglo-Saxon complement to the perspective of post-
Operaism—less inclined to revive socialist humanism, and better able to develop a new positive 
humanism“ (Negri, 2014). 
 What accelerationists want to accelerate then, is precisely the tendency toward machinic 
																																																								
56 Apart from the ’Fragment’, accelerationists also draw on the Communist Manifesto, with its 
recognition of capitalism’s capacity to ’melt all that is solid into air’, as well as the 1859 preface, where 
Marx suggests that “the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations 
of production [and] from forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their 
fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution.” In all three cases, what the accelerationists take from 
Marx is the admiration of capitalism’s capacity to continuously break down barriers and dissolve social 
structures.  
 
57 Already in Empire, Hardt & Negri also suggested that the crucial task was to not simply resist Empire, 
but rather to reorganised and redirected its liberatory potentials towards new ends.     
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subsumption of society described by Marx in the Fragment.58 Accelerationism in other words, 
actively embrace processes of creative destruction, abstraction and maximal modernization 
taking place in the contemporary technological city. For since they see no possibility of going 
back, and the only way ‘is through and beyond,’ they propose that the task for the contemporary 
left is to beat capitalism at its own game of technological upgrading and thereby develop a leftist 
“sociotechnical hegemony.” In other words, the problem for accelerationists is not development, 
but rather that development under contemporary capitalism is not taking place fast enough.59 
 Accelerationism also makes more explicit the problem of technology that permeates the 
Fragment. For one of the central tenants of an accelerationist politics, as suggested in the 
epigraph, is the reappropriation of contemporary capitalism’s infrastructures for different ends. 
In this sense, the accelerationist project differs from post-Workerism in that it foregrounds 
technology itself as central to the post-capitalist project.60 In the Accelerationist manifesto, 
Srnicek and Williams argue that capitalism is in fact standing in the way of technological 
progress, and therefore “the true transformative potentials of much of our technological and 
scientific research remain unexploited” (2013).   
 However, by centering on the perceived contradiction between the technological forces 
of production and the social relations of capital, accelerationism comes awfully close to 
appropriating the objectivist view on technology dominant in the crude Marxism of the 
Comintern.  For as Stalin wrote almost a century earlier, the "capitalist relations of production 
have ceased to correspond to the state of productive forces of society and have come into 
irreconcilable contradiction with them”; revolutionaries thus learn that their ’mission’ is "to 
replace the existing capitalist ownership of the means of production by socialist ownership” 																																																								
58 “We want to accelerate the process of technological evolution” write Srnicek and Williams.  
 
59 For useful critiques of this position, see Noys 2014 
 
60 In post-Workerism, technology, as we have seen, largely recedes into the background, as it is general 
social knowledge that is identified as the true dynamic force in contemporary society.     
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(quoted in Slater 1980, 17–18).  
 As I will argue next, this crude position on technology appropriated by accelerationists 
was debased already 50 years ago by one of the founding figures of Workerism.  By returning to 
this Workerist critique of technology, we can shed some additional light on the question of 
whether the contemporary digital city is … “a capitalist stage to be smashed … [or] a 
springboard to launch towards post-capitalism” (cf. Srnicek and Williams 2013). 
 
6.1 Critiques of technology – Workerism before the Fragment  
In order to complicate the explicit techno-optimistic of accelerationism (and the implicit one of 
post-Workerism), I want to return to the early days of Workerism, and to what we might refer to 
as the tradition’s pre-Fragment moment.61 The first important theoretical contribution coming 
out of this emerging tradition was namely a critique of technological objectivism developed by 
Raniero Panzieri, one of the founding figures of Workerism, and the editor of Quaderni Rossi 
(the first Workerist journal).  
In an essay titled the “Capitalist use of Machinery”, published in the first issue of 
Quaderni Rossi (1961), Panzieri challenged the instrumental conception of technology dominant 
within the Marxist-Leninist left at the time. From this dominant stand-point, technology was 
understood simply as forming part of the objective forces of production; forces that could be 
appropriated by, and in fact be put to better use under communism.62 Against this objectivist 
tendency, Panzieri argued that the social relations of production did not exist as some neatly 
separable layer that could simply be peeled of and replaced by a different model of organizing 
																																																								
61 A translation of the Fragment on Machines was published in the fourth issue of Quaderni 
Rossi(~1964), and quickly became a central and continuous reference point for Workerist and later post-
Workerist theorizations of capitalist transformation. 
 
62 Lenin famously argued that “Communism is government by the Soviets plus the electrification of the 
whole land”. And Stalin, as we already touched upon above, suggested an irreconcilable contradiction 
between the forces and social relations of production under capitalism, which necessitated a shift from 
capitalist to socialist ownership of the means of production.  
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society (such as communism). Instead, he famously suggested that the social relations of 
production (the antagonist relation between capital and labor) were found within the forces of 
production (Panzieri 1961 in Slater 1980). Technology was, in other words, not merely used in 
the capitalist production process, but was actively molded to improve and strengthen this very 
process. Technological progress could similarly not be separated out as an objective force, but 
was in many ways determined and shaped by the antagonistic relation of capital. What Panzieri 
articulated in his important article was a) that the materiality of technology matters since the 
relations of production are found within such technologies; and b), that the objectivist 
perspective on technology served as an effective ideology that concealed this fact.63  While the 
influence of Panzieri and his critique eventually diminished within Workerism, one study in 
particular, the study of Organic Composition of Capital and Labor-Power at Olivetti  by Romano 
Alquati, was heavily influenced by Panzieri’s work, and extended his critique of technology in 
important ways.64   
 
6.2 Alquati and the Study of the Olivetti factory   
In 1961, Romano Alquati (another key figure in early Workerism), wrote an article for the 
journal Quaderni Rossi based on extensive research he had conducted together with workers at 
the Olivetti factory in Ivera outside Turin.65  The Ivrea factory was one of the most advanced in 
																																																								
63 Panzieri was later accused of extending the idea of capitalist domination exerted through technology 
too far, by mistaking visions of rationalized landscapes for a reality which was in fact much messier and 
contradictory.  
 
64 His diminishing influence can in part be explained by the fact that Panzieri died prematurely in 1964 at 
the age of 43.  
 
65 The article was published in two parts partially in two subsequent issues of Quaderni Rossi in 1962-63 
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Italy at the time. 66 Alquati –one of the pioneers of a radical form of industrial sociology known 
as co-research – was particularly interested in delineating the changing political subjectivity of 
factory workers in the face of this advanced technical reconfiguration of industrial labor 
(Wright , 2013). The goal of the Olivetti study was to identify and possibly substantiate political 
currents and forms of resistance among workers emerging out of the hypermodern factory 
environment Ivrea represented. While the Olivetti text is primarily remembered as a text that 
explicitly articulated the workerist discourse on class composition (Wright, 2013), I’m here 
interested in how it also extends and substantiates the critique of technology and planning 
initiated by Panzieri.67 Alquati’s investigations, which heralds from the pre-Fragment moment in 
Italian Workerism, offers important insights on the relational, differential and spatial aspects of 
technological development that further help to problematize the techno-optimistic position 
expressed in accelerationist and tendential readings of Marx’s Fragment.  
In his analysis of the changing conditions of work at Olivetti, Alquati focused on the 
factory’s assembly line, in particular the conveyer belt. Alquati argued the assembly line signaled 
the advancement of automation and the closely related emergence of “new management 
techniques” for control and coordination of labor. Of particular importance was the increased 																																																								
66 Olivetti, for example, in 1964 launched the Programma 101, which is considered to be the first 
commercial desktop computer.  
 
67 The concept of class composition – which can perhaps best be understood as a form of political 
analytic focused on the relation between the ‘objective’ or technical conditions of production and the 
emergent political subjectivities of the working class – emerged as part of the attempt by the early 
workerist scholars of the Quaderni Rossi group ( among others Raniero Panzieri, Mario Tronti, Romano 
Alquati and Antonio Negri) to grapple with the changing conditions of the Italian working class during an 
intense phase of Italian post-war industrialization known as the “Italian miracle”. During this period, 
millions of young unskilled workers migrated from the South to the industrializing cities of the North, 
constituting an emergent ‘new working class’ coming into formation in the rapidly expanding factory 
environments around cities like Turin and Milano. In this context, the idea of class composition 
importantly functioned to destabilizie ossified and mythical notions of the working class dominant within 
party and union circles at the time by approaching class as a historically situated process rather than an a 
priori category; as a class always in the making. Class composition here came to also imply a practice and 
research method (co-research) that committed the political renegades of the Italian far left to return to the 
factories and study the actual conditions of workers and their social struggles under changing technical 
(automation, deskilling) conditions of production in order to identify the revolutionary potential of this 
new emerging subject of the “mass worker” and how it related to the transformations of capitalism.  
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centrality of ‘control information’ for monitoring, planning and optimization of the production 
process (Wright, 2013).68 The cybernetic logic of informationalization and optimization 
developed at Olivetti was, however, not to be understood simply as a model and technology for 
the spatio-temporal reconfiguration of the ‘most advanced’ forms of assembly labor within the 
factory itself. Rather, Alquati argued, the real significance of the assembly system at Olivetti was 
“as an explicative template of a whole series of vaster (internal and external) phenomena” 
(Alquati 1961). In a remarkable passage, his analysis of the assembly line leads Alquati to 
anticipate what we today refer to as global production/value chains and computer-coordinated 
just-in-time production:  
The equipment is a fact of even greater importance than it materially appears to those who view 
it. It is this that links the workstations, connecting them also as phases on the assembly process, 
and linking them in a global cycle within which each job is inserted. They integrate operations in 
a mechanical way, and coordinate them spatially and temporally with the totality of the other 
moments of production (for example, the conveyor brings the components from the various 
workshops where they have been manufactured) and has a constant rhythm that needs to 
express, with its regularity, a whole series of predetermined steps [scadenze], etc., etc., various 
quantities, various types, in various pre-established moments. The equipment expresses all this 
already. It already encapsulates the global logic of neo-capitalism connected to the phase of 
automation, of decentralization, of delegated planning, of enterprise- wide integrated planning, 
etc., and of the system with its market and its “qualitative” consumer goods. The equipment of 
the assembly line, rather than the supervisor, has the function of organizing labor according to 
this logic. The supervisor’s function instead involves integrating or compensating for the 
secondary dysfunctions that the system in its imperfection produces. (Alquati 1961) 
More than simply a technology for subjugating factory workers, Alquati in the Olivetti assembly 
line finds the material manifestation of a centralized logic of control for a distributed production 
system. This system allows for the increasing integration and coordination of a wide variety of 																																																								
68 See also Pasquinelli (2015) on how Alquati in the Olivetti study provide an early theorization of the 
valorization of information  
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processes and flows also in the surrounding region, including “auxiliary” and “artisanal” forms 
of labor such as transportation, small-scale workshop labor, and agricultural production. All of 
these different moments increasingly became functions within a “single unity” of the production 
cycle coordinated by the rhythms of the conveyer belt. 69 Echoing his comrade Mario Tronti’s 
conceptualization of the “social factory” as the extension of the factory logic to the whole of 
society, Alquati draws the conclusion that “the factory [therefore] does not exist as a moment 
that can be separated” (ibid). The implications of this for the organization of struggle, Alquati’s 
argued, was that the insights gathered at Olivetti had to be carried beyond the immediate context 
of the factory process and understood as a “part within the whole that we ‘are keeping an eye 
on’” (ibid). It was, in other words, crucial to link the technological decomposition of labor in the 
industrial factories of the North to other parts of the ongoing cycle of struggles in Italy and 
beyond, thereby countering the increased atomization of struggles caused by the deepened 
divisions of labor to “attain that generality of discourse that renders struggle global” (ibid). 
Out of this analysis emerges two important insights that can help to further substantiate 
the problems of objectivist accounts of technological modernization outlined above. The first 
relates to Alquati’s emphasis on the need to understand the relations between the ‘pole of 
development’ represented by the Olivetti factory, and the larger totality within which this 
development is taking place. What Alquati shows is that while it is absolutely central to trace the 
latest and most advanced tendencies within capitalist production, it is equally important to avoid 
the objectivist trap that reifies such tendencies as something that can be understood and analysed 
by and of itself. The role of the militant researcher, for Alquati was exactly to surpass such 
“blind empiricism” and link the hypermodern factory order to other, and at first seemingly 
disparate and anachronistic, forms of struggle. Here Alquati connects Olivetti not only to the 
outsourcing of production to the small firms in the surrounding region, but also to violence of 
																																																								
69 A process which Alquati suggested was “driving the “full intensification of labor exploitation, at all 
levels” (ibid). 
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the colonial relations that were at the time of Alquati’s writing made particularly clear by the 
decolonial struggle in Algeria. For, as he suggests, it is “the colonial profits [that] make possible 
at Ivrea the introduction of plant that carries the intensification in the exploitation of the 
workers of the “pole of development” to an even more advanced level, and vice versa” (ibid). 
These different forms of exploitation are, Alquati argues, inextricably related, and has to be 
understood as internal to, and productive of, the globalized ‘neocapitalist’ system which 
functions “precisely thanks to its internal imbalances, that reproduce relative “depressions” 
internally, and deepens them in order to advance as a system of profit (ibid). 
Olivetti’s Ivrea factory, as an anticipation of a cybernetic model of capitalist organization, 
is not so much a pinnacle of technological rationalization to be celebrated or cursed as a site of 
unique productivity or exploitation, as it is to be understood as a relational and strategic space 
accumulating power over a distributed network through its capacity to regulate flows. “The 
interdependence tightens”, Alquati writes, “but the propulsive moment belongs to the large firm, 
of the most advanced technological level, as power, as the concentration here of the profit 
motive” (ibid). Alquati’s analysis is valuable exactly because it poses a challenge to any crude 
accelerationist and developmentalist narrative that privileges the supposedly highest stage of 
development as heralding the inevitable techno-scientific overcoming of the increasingly 
moribund relations of production. Rather, what his analysis shows is how neocaptalism is 
precisely a system that thrives on the simultaneous existence of ‘poles of development’, and areas 
of underdevelopment to be played off against each other.  
Building on the critique of technology and technocratic rationalization initiated by 
Panzieri, Alquati’s study further complicates the problem of technological reappropriation as it 
has been posed by Accelerationists above. For Alquati, the conveyer belt is not simply a tool 
incorporated into and deployed according to a neo-capitalist logic of globalized exploitation and 
domination. Rather, it constitutes and encapsulates this very logic “in its pure state” (ibid). There 
is, following Panzieri, no clear line of separation between the social relations and the technical 
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configuration of production – and for both Alquati and Panzieri, the advancement of 
communication technologies and technocratic rationalization in the production process, as 
exemplified by Olivetti, is understood precisely as the objective appearance of the extension and 
deepening of capitalism’s despotic subsumption of labor on a global scale.70 
One obvious problem with this position is that it appears to reduce planning and techno-
science to the logic of exploitation and profit–seeking capitalism – as being capitalist through 
and through (precisely the problem that Marx was attempting to avoid in the second part of the 
Fragment). However, while this is obviously then a problematic position, this problem of over-
extending in a dystopic direction does not necessarily take the thrust out of the critique 
developed by Panzieri, which was aimed at the objectivist or reified understanding of technology, 
planning and development common among Italian (and other) Marxists at the time. 
Furthermore, I want to suggest that already in Alquati, we find a more nuanced picture. Alquati’s 
study suggests the importance of connecting the analysis of specific technologies and 
technological affordances to the larger socio-technical totality, where the specific technology is 
understood as always situated within a complex set of relations which it is both shaped by and 
simultaneously transforms.  
Deleuze and Guattari would come to argue that “the technical machine is …  not a cause 
but merely an index of a general form of social production…” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983). 
Over a decade earlier, Alquati showed how the conveyer belt in its specificity offered a window 
onto the larger social totality that had produced it. While this conveyer belt should not be 
reduced to a pure materialization of capitalist despotism, neither should it be treated simply as an 
objective force of production that can be appropriated for different ends. Rather, what Alquati’s 
work on the Olivetti factory implies is that any serious political project aimed at the 
																																																								
70 We can here see how Alquati’s analysis resonates with the first part of the ‘Fragment’, where Marx 
describes how the machine is the ideal form of capital, because it objectifies or crystalizes the division of 
labor (relations of production).  
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emancipation of society from the capital relation will necessarily have to be a socio-technical 
project.  
Having outlined this critical perspective on technology from a pre-Fragment moment in 
Italian Workerism, I would like to return to the Fragment itself in relation to contemporary 
theorizations of the metropolis. Drawing on eminent urban and spatial theorist Henri Lefebvre’s 
reading of the Fragment, the final section of this thesis introduces the vector of space as an 
important complication to tendential theorizations of urban transformation common in the 
























7. THE FRAGMENT AND URBAN TRANSFORMATIONS 
 
In a section of the often overlooked book La Pensée Marxiste et la Ville (Marxist Thought and the 
City, 1972), French Marxist and urban theorist Henri Lefebvre engages the ideas of technology 
and automation as posed in Marx’s famous ‘Fragment on Machines’ in relation to his own 
emerging work on urban society.71  In his reading, Lefebvre suggests that the emergence of the 
‘general intellect’ – the now familiar distributed production system of automated machines and 
social cooperation – is directly connected to the dissolution of both the spatial unit of the 
industrial city and the social order of wage labor. “To the list of ends” he writes, “we can now 
add the end of work and the end of the city”(Lefebvre 1974, 64). In a dialectical but also 
somewhat mysterious formulation, Lefebvre suggest that work is not replaced by free time, 
however, but rather with non-work.72 And the city “does not end with the country, but in the 
simultaneous overcoming of city and country.” In its place emerges urbanism, dissolving both 
the city and country and replacing them with a new scale of (planetary) urban centralization and 
peripherializaiton (see Brenner 2014; Merrifield 2013).  
In contrast to many of the post-Workerist, who read the Fragment as a hymn to the 
revolutionary potentials emerging out of a society permeated by techno-science and automated 
																																																								
71 This book was translated into a number of different languages in the 1970’s, but never to English. This 
has meant that it has been largely neglected in Anglo-American readings of Lefebvre, with a few 
exceptions (see Merrifield, 2013).  La Pensée is interesting, in part because it came out in the middle of 
period during which Lefebvre penned some of his most important work, including The Right to the City 
(1968), The Urban Revolution (1970), The Survival of Capitalism (1973), and The Production of Space (1974).  
 
72 More specifically, Lefebvre suggests that “[t]he activities that they are dealing with, and especially the 
intellectual (scientific) activities through which they create the social brain that directs the bodily organs 
(the automated machines/mechanisms) can not be compared to work.” (Lefebvre 1972, my translation) But 
this dissolution of work can also be said to resonate with Fredric Jameson’s more recent thesis on how 
capitalism is a system that ultimately produces unemployment (Jameson 2011). 
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machinery, Lefebvre takes a somewhat more pessimistic stance towards the development 
anticipated by Marx. For here, the prospect originally outlined in the Fragment is read in relation 
to his own recently formulated hypothesis of a great urban revolution (Lefebvre 1970/2003). In 
this context, Lefebvre sees how the Fragment anticipates a further expulsion of urban 
populations from concrete productive practices, leaving many of them increasingly confined 
under urban regimes of automation, calculation and control. “What would happen”, he writes in 
La Pensée, 
...if the automatic devices invaded the streets, the monuments, the homes? If the combination of 
mechanic and intellectual elements occupied the intellect and subordinated humans in the 
process? ... how is one to overcome this new monster, Leviathan, Golem? Is it absolutely 
necessary to cooperate with him, try to reach a compromise instead of taking the lead oneself? 
(Lefebvre 1974, 64–65, my translation) 
Drawing on the Fragment, Lefebvre poses the question of how to relate to the increased 
pervasiveness of automated and informational technologies in urban space he detected already in 
the 1970’s. Should we engage with it for imagining and working towards a different form of life? 
Are we to wait for the potential self-collapse of capitalism that Marx had anticipated? Or are we 
being led into the further subordination to a system of cybernetic ordering and control?  
Only a year later, in The Survival of Capitalism (1973), Lefebvre would return to this 
problem of modern technology that he had encountered in the Fragment in relation to his 
attempt to understand the “reproduction of the relations of production”. Here he would come 
to suggest that machinic automation and the productivity of knowledge... 
...may be the guarantee of change, from a society which is manipulative (of people, of needs and 
its own aims) to a society which is even more smoothly manipulative. It may thus serve the 
reproduction of the relations of production beyond the mode of production from which those 
relations were born. This is merely a strategic hypothesis...  (Lefebvre 1976, 74) 
In interpreting this “strategic hypothesis”, we might be helped by Stuart Elden, who notes that 
“the French title of this work —La survie du capitalisme —is more ambiguous than the English, 
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because survie means 'afterlife' as well as 'survival'” (Elden 2004, 236). Perhaps Marx was right in 
the ‘Fragment’ to pose automation and the increased centrality of knowledge and innovation as 
the dissolution or transformation of capitalism beyond reprieve. But unlike the teleological post-
Workerist reading of the fragment as revolutionary theory, Lefebvre remains more wary of the 
techno-optimism that permeates the second part of the Fragment. What if (as Marx seems to 
imply in the first part of the text) the relations of domination and processes of fragmentation 
survive in the automated systems, in the logics of calculation, in the ‘programmed’ spaces of 
ordering? Or put more crudely, can we really trust capitalism to self-collapse and leave us with all 
the good stuff, while at the same time bringing all the bad with it into its grave? Can we not end 
up with the opposite scenario? What if whatever comes after capitalism, capitalism ‘afterlife’, is 
even worse? 
 These hypothetical questions brings us back to Alberto Toscano’s questioning of the 
supposed autonomy of the cooperative capacities of immaterial labor. For Lefebvre is, similarly 
to Panzieri and Alquati, concerned with the material aspects of machinic society outlined in the 
first part of the fragment, and especially of what happens as this machinic impetus extends 
beyond the immediate tools of production, increasingly permeating entire lives, neighborhoods, 
and cities.  
Drawing on Lefebvre’s reading of the Fragment, and Toscano’s critique, we can begin to 
delineate a dystopic inversion of the biopolitical metropolis proposed by Hardt & Negri.73 In this 
dystopic metropolis, urban space is increasingly recast into a form adequate for networked 
capitalism. This metropolitan form imposes on its citizens a constant demand to connect, 
communicate and interact through its landscape of proliferating interfaces – appearing more as a 
forced labor camp for (im)material labor, than a territory promising increasing autonomy. And 
while perhaps leading towards the end of capitalism as we know it, there are no guarantees that 
																																																								
73 This can be read in conjunction with what Lefebvre would later come to call ‘abstract space’. 
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this networked landscape would not provide the basis for a mode of production even more 
unamicable to collective freedoms and rights to self-management than contemporary capitalism.  
To outline these two positions from a slightly different perspective, we can turn briefly 
to a conversation that took place between Gilles Deleuze and Antonio Negri in 1990. In this 
conversation, Toni Negri’s suggested that perhaps communism is “less utopian than it used to 
be” in a society centered on communication and networked technologies (thus prefiguring what 
would eventually end up becoming Hardt & Negri’s thesis on the biopolitical metropolis). In 
response to this claim, Deleuze retorted that “the quest for uni-versals of communication should 
make us shudder”, adding that “creating has always been different from communicating” and 
that the key is to no extend systems of communication and control, but rather “to create 
vacuoles of noncommunication” (Deleuze 1990).  
When Lefebvre speaks of the ‘charade of interactivity’ that he saw as characteristic of the 
emergent forms of information and communication technologies, he displays a similar 
skepticism towards any crude emancipatory hopes pinned to the development of networked 
technologies (Lefebvre 1989/2014). For Lefebvre, as for Deleuze, there is nothing inherently 
emancipatory about a digital networked communications.  Yet, in treading the balance between 
optimistic and despotic views on technology we can find particular value in his work.74 While 
Lefebvre sees how technology is central to the reproduction of the relations of production, 
neither the production of technology nor the production of space in his work, is reducible to a 
capitalist command. Rather, both technology and space are processes fraught with the conflicts 
																																																								
74 In this sense, Lefebvre position is quite close to that of Andrew Feenberg. who against what he calls 
instrumental and substantiative perspectives on technology has argued for need to develop critical 
theories of technology. Such theories, for Feenberg, acknowledges that technology is not neutral, but at 
the same time refuses to accept a narrative that portrays technology as an autonomous and increasingly 
despotic force.  Rather, a critical theory of technology involves reopening technology as a site of politics, 
or “as a scene of struggle”, suggesting that technology cannot be neatly separated out from the social 
processes that it forms an intricate part of. (see Feenberg 2002, introduction) 
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and contradictions that characterize capitalist society more broadly.75 Every attempt by capital to 
resolve such contradictions through the production of cohesion are therefore doomed to fail, 
and will always be met by new cracks in the pavement, and the opening up of new strategic sites 
of resistance.76 In the light of this, Lefebvre’s question of whether to collaborate with the urban 
general intellect or take the lead oneself appears as more explicitly concerned with finding what 
political strategies and emergent political pressure points might be effectively engaged with in 
this emergent techno-social landscape. 
While this question might appear similar to the accelerationist position discussed above, 
it in fact it points in a distinctly different direction. While accelerationism nihilistically proposes 
to push capitalism beyond itself, Lefebvre and his attention to the spatial dimension offers an 
explosion of the teleological reading of the Fragment offered by post-Workerist and 
Accelerationists. Lefebvre recognizes that we cannot go back, but at the same time sees how we 
cannot simply go through and with capitalism. Just as nostalgia is not a viable political strategy, 
neither is an embrace of accelerated technological change and capitalist processes of creative 
destruction.  
Space here, for Lefebvre, becomes a way of adding dimensions to the movement of the 
dialectic.77 All of a sudden, we no longer simply move in terms of a singular historical transition 
from subsumption to emancipation, from one stage of techno-social production to the next.  
Rather, what emerges is a complex landscape constituted by the criss-crossing of different 
spatio-temporal trajectories, scales, and forms of exploitation, which in Lefebvre, all more or less 																																																								
75 Not counting the significant philosophical differences, Lefebvre’s position here, I would argue, is also 
quite close to that of Gilles Deleuze, both in its skepticism of any technological fetishism, but also in 
suggesting that technology can only be understood by situating it within a larger context (see, for 
example, Deleuze 1992).  
 
76 In the Production of Space (1991) , Lefebvre would suggest that the homogenizing “abstract space carries 
within itself the seeds of a new kind of space … ‘differential space’”  
 
77 For a discussion of Lefebvre’s spatial dialectic and its utility for mapping contemporary capitalism, see 
Fredric Jameson’s Valences of Dialectic (2009) 66-70 
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become subsumed under a process of planetary centralization and peripherialization (cf. Brenner 
2014).  Whereas the post-Workerist post-dialectical framework presents as a surprisingly closed, 
singular and one–directional narrative, Lefebvre’s dialectics offers an open, multiple and 
indeterminate becoming of an urban machinic society.  
I want to conclude be revisiting the starting point for this thesis: the perceived need for 
new geographical frameworks or cognitive maps to help us navigate and act in the city of digital 
capitalism. A key reference point for such a project is Marx’s Fragment on Machines, which has 
served as the basis for many theorizations of contemporary capitalism.  However, by grounding 
their theorization of the metropolis in a tendential reading of the Fragment, Hardt & Negri, 
together with other post-Workerists help reproduce “the geographical imagination that 
accompanies the synecdochal characterisation of cities” (Massey 2007, 88). For Massey, this 
strategy of synecdoche – whereby one part of an urban economy is made to stand in for the 
whole – fundamentally serves to obscure the deep relationality and heterogeneity of cities 
(including many other elements of any urban economy). Mobilized in many contemporary urban 
redevelopment schemes, synecdochal representations suggest there is a singular figure, sector, or 
process that is ‘the one to bet on’ (or in Hardt & Negri’s terms, ‘the one to liberate’).78 The 
synecdoche thereby, as Massey has suggested elsewhere, reduces ”geography into history, space 
into time” (Massey 2005, 5). Clinging on to the “cosmology” of the single narrative or tendency, 
this schema “obliterates the multiplicities, the contemporaneous heterogeneities of space. It 
reduces simultaneous coexistence to place in the historical queue” (ibid).   
Taking the urban seriously involves introducing the multiplicity, relationality and 
becoming of urban space into the reading of the Fragment (cf. Massey 2005). Engaging with the 
dialectic between the two narratives of the Fragment spatially, rather than just temporally, I want to 
																																																								
78 Negri in a recent essay suggested that “we are still dealing with a class, but a different one, and one 
endowed with a higher power. It is the class of cognitive labor. This is the class to liberate, this is the class 
that has to free itself” (Negri 2014).  
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suggest, opens the ground for developing a more complex and relational framework for 
navigating and acting in the contemporary metropolis. This ‘spatialized’ framework leads us away 
from some of the traps of tendential methods of analysis and accelerationist modes of politics 
and is, to borrow the words of De Angelis, better primed to “capture both the synchronic 
configuration and the diachronic dynamic of a heterogeneous body of labour in relation to 




























This thesis departs from the common conception that cities today are becoming primary 
frontiers for the construction of techno-capitalist futures. In order to navigate and act in these 
emergent landscapes, we need to develop new urban cognitive maps that combine insights from 
different existing frameworks.  I have here initiated such a ‘mapping’ project by pointing to 
Marx’s Fragment on Machines as a key text underlying a number of contemporary theorizations of 
the relationship between technology, capitalism and political subjectivity. In order to interrogate 
these theories, I have argued, we must return to the Fragment itself, tracing the ways in which it 
has been read into the contemporary moment. We must evaluate and question what the 
implications are of these readings for the politics of the contemporary digital city. 
  The (post-)Workerist reading of the Fragment has undoubtedly constituted the basis for 
a rich set of theoretical writings on the emergent forms of capitalist exploitation and the related 
figures of political struggle in the digital age. But it is a reading that, as I have argued in this 
thesis, also bears significant problems when used as the ground for a critical theorization of the 
contemporary metropolis (as in the case of Hardt & Negri’s Commonwealth). For these 
affirmative and tendential readings of the Fragment tend to enact a problematically capital-
centered master narrative – one that embraces and objectifies the growing importance of 
machinic automation and knowledge-centered production as a step towards capitalism’s 
imminent self-implosion. As Steven Shaviro has suggested, theorists such as Hardt & Negri are a 
bit too enamored of the Californian ideology of informational productivity (Shaviro 2008). They 
thus run the risk of generating urban theorizations that legitimize rather than question the 
current wave of urban creative destruction launched on the back of a promise to further 
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augment the communicative and collaborative capacities of the contemporary metropolitan 
landscape. The challenge for a new critical urban theory is to expose the limits of such master 
narratives (whether in the form of ideologies of digital urbanism, or as theories of cognitive 
cooperation or technological acceleration), and shift focus to an analysis of the differential, 
fragmented and relational aspects that characterize the contemporary processes of planetary 
urbanization. Only by way of paying attention to the differential relation between those ‘most 
advanced sectors’ embraced by the tendential analyst, and the contemporaneous processes of 
displacement, dispossession and raw exploitation equally characteristic of present-day capitalism, 
can we hope to begin to delineate a political terrain (the emerging lines of antagonism, the 
strategic possibilities and constraints) of urban struggle in the digitalizing metropolis. As 
Lefebvre asks, do we really have to collaborate and reach a compromise with this “monster, 
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